Essays in International Economics by Chen, Xing
ii 
 
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
 
 
   By 
      XING CHEN 
   Bachelor of Arts in Finance  
   Capital University of Economics and Business 
   Beijing, China 
   2005 
 
   Master of Science in Economics  
   Oklahoma State University 
   Stillwater, OK 
   2007 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
   December, 2011  
ii 
 
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
       
     
 
 
   Dissertation Approved: 
 
Dr. Abdul Munasib 
  Dissertation Adviser 
   Dr. Dan Rickman 
 
   Dr. Bidisha Lahiri 
 
   Dr. Devesh Roy 
  Outside Committee Member 
  Dr. Sheryl A. Tucker 
   Dean of the Graduate College 
  
iii 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
The global market is increasingly becoming more integrated, and in recent year 
international trade has constituted a large proportion of the world‘s total GDP. I study 
three different, although sometimes related, aspects of international economic issues. 
First of all, the financial crisis of 1997-1998 in Indonesia – while different in many 
characteristics – is similar in a number of aspects to the subprime crisis in the U.S. a 
decade later. By analyzing the data from Indonesia about housing consumption patterns 
and asset allocation at the micro level, we can get valuable insights about whether the 
depreciation and volatility of housing assets have negative effects on household‘s 
consumption and asset allocation. Secondly, I examine the effect of social value in terms 
of trust on exports through financial channel. Exports may be limited by a country‘s level 
of financial development level but trust can work as a proxy for informal credit resources 
and supplement formal credit resources to reduce financial constraints. Thirdly, 
alternative measures of financial reforms are employed to show that the effects of 
individual reforms measures on exports as well as their additional contributions in sectors 
with different levels of financial dependence and asset tangibility can be different. 
  
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. HOUSE VALUE FLUCTUATIONS, THE HOUSEHOLDS ADJUSTMENT OF 
CONSUMPTION AND ASSET ALLOCATION ...................................................1 
  
 Abstract ....................................................................................................................1 
 Introduction ..............................................................................................................3 
 Literature reviews ....................................................................................................8 
  House value fluctuation and household behavior  .............................................8 
  The case of Indonesia.......................................................................................10 
  The housing market crisis in the U.S ...............................................................11  
 Data ........................................................................................................................13 
 Underlying model ..................................................................................................15  
 Estimation and findings .........................................................................................18  
  Consumption expenditure ................................................................................20 
  Asset allocation ................................................................................................23 
 Conclusion .............................................................................................................24 
 References ..............................................................................................................27 
 Appendix ................................................................................................................39 
 
II. SOCIAL VALUES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE INTERPLAY 
BETWEEN SOCIAL VALUES AND FORMAL FINANCE...............................40 
 
 Abstract ..................................................................................................................40 
 Introduction ............................................................................................................42 
 Literature reviews ..................................................................................................49 
 Data ........................................................................................................................56 
 Model .....................................................................................................................65 
 Results ....................................................................................................................68 
  Main results ......................................................................................................68 
  Robustness check .............................................................................................70 
 Conclusion .............................................................................................................71 
 References ..............................................................................................................74 
 Appendix ................................................................................................................90 
 
III. FINANCIAL REFORM AND EXPORTS: AN INVESTIGATION WITH 
MULTIPLE REFORM MEASURES ....................................................................91
v 
 
  
Chapter          Page 
  
 Abstract ..................................................................................................................91 
 Introduction ............................................................................................................92 
 Data and descriptive statistics ................................................................................97 
 Model ...................................................................................................................101 
 Results ..................................................................................................................102 
 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................105 
 References ............................................................................................................107 
 Appendix ..............................................................................................................118 
 
  
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table           Page 
 
   Table 1.1 Change across the Four Waves in IFLS....................................................29 
   Table 1.2 Assets allocation and consumption pattern  
  for urban households in IFLS ...................................................................30 
   Table 1.3 Variable Descriptions ...............................................................................31 
   Table 1.4 Descriptive Statistics.................................................................................33 
   Table 1.5 Expenditure OLS Regression ....................................................................34 
   Table 1.6 Expenditure Fixed Effect Regression .......................................................36 
   Table 1.7 Asset Shares 3SLS Regression Categories  ..............................................37 
   Table 1.8 Responsiveness (% changes) ....................................................................38 
   Table A1.1 Estimates by Expenditure Quartiles .......................................................39 
   Table 2.1 Statistics of Trust Variables by Wave .......................................................78 
   Table 2.2 Statistics of Formal Credit ........................................................................79 
   Table 2.3a Mean of Exports by Categories of Financial Variables ..........................80 
   Table 2.3b Mean of Exports by Categories of Financial Variables  
  without China ..........................................................................................81 
   Table 2.4a Statistics of Trust Variables by Credit Categories ..................................82 
   Table 2.4b Statistics of Trust Variables by Credit Categories without China ..........83  
vii 
 
Table           Page 
 
   Table 2.5 Correlation of Export and Trust Variables  
  by Financial Development Category ........................................................84 
   Table 2.6a Estimation using Total Exports ...............................................................85 
   Table 2.6b Estimation in Two Digit Bilateral Exports .............................................86    
   Table 2.6c Estimation in Three Digit Bilateral Exports ...........................................87    
   Table A2.1 Country list by wave ..............................................................................90 
   Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables ..........................................................110 
   Table 3.2 Correlations among Exports and Reform Indicators ..............................111    
   Table 3.3a Average Value of Exports by Different Category  
  of Reform Indicators  ............................................................................112    
   Table 3.3b Average Value of Exports by Different Category  
  of Reform Indicators in China ..............................................................113 
   Table 3.4a Estimation Results with Full Dataset ....................................................114    
   Table 3.4b Estimation Results without China.........................................................116    
   Table A3.1 List of Countries in Sample .................................................................118 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure           Page 
 
   Figure 2.1 World‘s Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) .............................88 
   Figure 2.2 The Number of Trade Partners in International Trade ............................89 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
HOUSE VALUE FLUCTUATIONS, THE HOUSEHOLDS ADJUSTMENT OF 
CONSUMPTION AND ASSET ALLOCATION 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Facing large house value depreciations, how will the households adjust allocation of 
assets and their expenditures? We look for evidence in Indonesia over the period 1993 
and 2007, which faced a major economic crisis in 1997-1998. We use the Indonesia 
Family Life Survey (IFLS) to study urban homeowners to test if large house value 
fluctuations contribute to changes in household consumption patterns or asset allocation. 
We distinguish the rate of return on housing assets into two categories: appreciation and 
depreciation. To eliminate the error in self-report housing value, we predict the house 
price based on its location, characteristics, etc., in the first stage. The estimation results 
do not provide significant evidence to claim that household‘s consumption and allocation 
would be changed in case of depreciation of housing assets. Due to some similarities 
between the subprime financial crisis in the U.S. and the economic crisis that took place a 
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decade ago in Indonesia, these analyses may provide some insights into the adjustment 
processes that are likely underway, or expected in the near future in the U.S. economy. 
3 
 
I.  Introduction 
A multitude of household‘s consumption and asset allocation decisions depend on 
the value of its housing asset holdings. As wealth increases, households are likely to 
consume more normal goods (Bostic, Gabreil and Painter 2009). Most studies find that 
when asset values appreciate, the household chooses to consume certain part of the 
premium – the marginal propensity to consume – which may be different across different 
types of assets.
1
 Marginal propensity to consume on housing assets is argued to be higher 
than other types of assets. Bostic, Gabreil and Painter (2009) find that the elasticity of 
consumption with respect to housing assets is almost three times of the one of financial 
wealth. As a result, compared to other assets, the volatility of housing price is more likely 
to affect household consumption level and asset portfolio.  
Leonerd (2010) argues that there are two channels thorough which housing wealth 
appreciation increases consumption: first, households may view the appreciated housing 
wealth as substitution for current income, in which case the increased income will raise 
consumption. Second way is by converting the rising house value into cash to finance 
consumption. Haurin and Rosenthal (2006) show that following the house price 
appreciation, people begin to adjust their expenditure to consumer part of the increased 
amount of house values. Usually the appreciation part can be gained either by acquiring 
more debt, or by buying financial assets, though the latter way actually shows little 
response to the extra house capital gains. They also find that households will spend 15 
cents to finance consumption as 1 dollar increases of house assets on average.  
                                                          
1
 Dvornak and Kohler (2007) study of Australian housing market shows that households spend 6-9 more 
cents on consumption due to $1 permanent increase in stock market wealth, and 3 more cents due to the 
same increase in housing wealth. In U.S., one dollar increase in housing wealth brings 10 cents extra 
spending on consumption while the same in increase in financial wealth only brings an increase of 2 extra 
cents (Leonerd, 2010). 
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Additionally, since households tend to hold the assets with higher rates of return 
and lower risk, and also since households prefer to holding a larger share of the assets 
with larger marginal propensity to consume (Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud, 2004), house 
value appreciation also encourages households to hold a larger share of housing assets in 
their portfolios. Dusansky and Koc (2007) show that when housing price increase, the 
owner-occupied housing demand curve would be upward sloping curve if treating 
housing assets as investment asset. 
The existing studies of the effects of house value changes on consumption and 
asset holdings typically studied the situation where house values increased. Haurin and 
Rosenthal (2006), Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud (2009), Dvornak and Kohler (2007) report 
their results based on housing value appreciation. While we should also expect such 
adjustments in response to a house value decline, there is no a priori reason to believe 
that these effects are going to be symmetrically opposite to those of house value 
appreciation. Furthermore, the latest housing market crisis in the U.S – which has taken 
the center stage in the recent debates – brought in large house price depreciation. A study 
of the implications of house price fluctuation on household consumption and asset 
allocation, therefore, needs to include house value depreciation.  
There are a number of potential reasons to expect asymmetric impacts of house 
value appreciation and depreciation. First, the marginal effect of increased wealth on 
consumption may differ from that of decreased wealth; habit formation, preference for 
consumption smoothing, etc., may create a downward rigidity in at least some types of 
consumption goods. In case of asset holdings, since housing is also a durable 
consumption good – and the fact that investing in housing assets is often subject to 
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indivisibility and irreversibility – the marginal effect of house value decreases on the 
household‘s portfolio composition may be different from that of a house value rising up. 
This paper addresses the above issues using a large household sample from Indonesian 
(Indonesia Family Life Survey, IFLS 1993-2007). 
An additional motivation for this study is gaining understanding of the latest 
financial crisis in the U.S. During the time interval 1993-2007, our period of analysis, 
Indonesia witnessed one of the worst financial and economic crises of recent decades 
followed by a full recovery. Its GDP growth rate keeps rising from a severe drop in 1998, 
and reaches 6.28% in 2007 though it is still lower than 7.82% in 1996. The collapse of 
exchange rate system is one of main consequences of the financial crisis in Indonesia. 
After switching to floating exchange rate, the local currency unit per USD generally falls 
into the internal between 7800 to 11,000 Indonesia rupiah (IDR) per USD, which is much 
more stable compared to the period from 1997 to1998 during which period the exchange 
rate jumped from 2900 to 10,000 IDR per USD. In Table 1.1, we report some of the key 
numbers of housing and consumption movement from the sample. We observe large 
procyclical fluctuations in house values and consumption patterns. The corresponding 
numbers for the U.S. during the subprime crisis are similar.
2
 Although the reasons 
triggering financial crises in the two countries (Indonesian in 1997-1998 and the U.S. in 
2008) and the nature of the fallout are not exactly the same, we may still gain some 
valuable insight into the current U.S. housing market turmoil.
3
 
                                                          
2
 We discuss these in detail in section II. 
3
 We discuss some of the similarities and difference in these two cases in section II. 
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We study household consumption and asset allocation of urban homeowners in 
Indonesia.
4
 The economic conditions in Indonesia over our period of analysis witnessed 
significant ups and downs. Indonesia was known as one of emerging market success 
stories in Southeast Asia before 1997. From the mid-1960s to the mid 1990s, it was 
regarded as one of the eight economic miracles by the World Bank. From 1990 to 1996, 
the GDP growth rate was averaging 8%; the average unemployment rate was as low as 
3.9%. In the middle of 1997, IDR collapsed by the attack of speculators and the financial 
crisis was triggered. In 1998, GDP growth rate fell dramatically to as low as -13.1%. 
Meanwhile, 23.4% of the population was drawn under the poverty line, which was 
doubled of that in 1996 (11.3%). The house price also declined during the financial crisis. 
Since 1998, the change of housing price in real value was rapidly falling reaching as low 
as -40% in 1999. After the most severe period, the housing price gradually recovered. 
The Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) which shows the price of all types of 
dwelling houses in big cities performs continuously increasing since 2002. Until the 
fourth quarter of 2007, RPPI is up to 148 (2002 Q1=100). The large swings in the 
economy, especially in the housing market, makes Indonesia for the period 1993-2007, 
an ideal candidate for studying effects of house the housing market fluctuations on 
household decisions regarding consumption and asset allocation. 
The starting point of our analysis is the widely used Merton (1969) optimal 
portfolio allocation model with three types of assets – housing asset, non-housing assets 
and risk-free assets. This yields two types of equations: (a) consumption as a function of 
                                                          
4
 We only focus on the urban households for two important reasons. First, the property rights in the rural 
areas of a developing country such as Indonesia are poorly defined at best, rendering itself to any analysis 
involving house value changes of little meaning. Secondly, on average, the value of housing wealth takes 
more than 50% of the total assets for families living in cities. 
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asset returns and volatility, and some household characteristics, and (b) asset shares as 
functions of asset returns and volatility, and some household characteristics.  
In carrying out these estimations, we face two data problems. First, the house 
values are self-reported. In a developing country like Indonesia where the financial 
markets are not well-developed, self assessment is not likely to be as accurate as those in 
the developed countries. Therefore, we use a 2-stage estimation process where in the first 
stage we predict the house values using all household and location characteristics and 
detailed house characteristics that are available in the IFLS (e.g., type of house, rooms, 
materials used, other feature, etc.). The house characteristics are also our exclusion 
restriction in second stage.  
The second complication we face is that, in reporting their net worth, households 
under-reported their debts. In Merton model, the standard assumption is that households 
borrow at risk free rate. In the spirit of this assumption, we estimate the household‘s risk-
free asset holdings using a variety of household characteristics (demographic, financial, 
etc.) and use the predicted values to calculate the asset shares. Tobit model is applied to 
predict the probability that a household has debts. We also use a linear prediction for the 
value of risk-free assets of the household. We use the debt probability and predicted risk-
free asset values in the second stage where we carry out the estimation of the 
consumption and asset share models. 
We estimate the consumption equation for each of the following consumption 
expenditures: food, non-food, medical, education, and others.
5
 Since we are particularly 
                                                          
5
 Bostic, Gabriel & Painter (2005) find that house values are more important for non-durable consumption 
and financial assets are more important for durable consumption, possibly due to the fact that increase in 
house values are thought to be more permanent and households may change their non-durable consumption 
patterns in response to such changes. 
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interested in possible asymmetric effect of house value appreciation and depreciation, we 
create two separate variables to distinguish the direction of change of housing asset value. 
Exploiting the panel nature of the sample we use household fixed effects to account for 
any bias that may arise from (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity. We do not find a 
measureable effect of house value appreciation or depreciation on consumption.  
The asset share equations (one for housing assets and the other for non-housing 
assets) are simultaneous equations with each share appearing in the equation of the other. 
We use three stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate the effects of house value 
appreciation and volatility. 3SLS regression helps to estimate a system of simultaneous 
equations in which the dependent variables could be the explanatory variables in other 
equations. Since endogenous variables are on the right-hand-side in some structural 
equations, it will lead to the problem of error correlation among equations. To reduce the 
correlated errors, endogenous variables will be instrumented by all exogenous variables 
first, then being replaced on right-hand-side of equations by predicted instrumented value 
and covariance matrix. 
In what follows, in section II we discuss the literature on three issues relevant for 
this study:  house value fluctuation and household behavior, the Indonesian economy 
during the study period, and the recent U.S. housing crisis. In section III we discuss the 
data and in section IV the theoretical motivations. Section V has the estimation strategy 
and the results. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Literature Reviews 
House Value Fluctuation and Household Behavior 
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Haurin & Rosenthal (2006) find a positive relationship between house price 
appreciation and consumption. People consume part of their housing assets premium. 
Benjamin and Chinloy (2008) have similar conclusions. They claim that, for the 
households in the U.S., borrowing from assets can increase the cash and debt 
simultaneously with net wealth unchanged. By refinancing housing equity, households 
are able to get cash to raise consumption expenditure even without lowering net wealth. 
When interest rate is low and housing value appreciates, households can increase their 
mortgage level to smooth consumption.  
Bostic, Gabriel & Painter (2005) calculate the elasticity of consumption to 
different types of wealth. Their empirical results illustrate that, the elasticity of 
consumption to house value is highly significant. Additionally, house values are more 
important for non-durable consumption and financial assets are more important for 
durable consumption, possibly due to the fact that increase in house values are thought to 
be more permanent and households may change their non-durable consumption patterns 
in response to such changes.  
   Using time series data in the U.S., Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud (2004) explain 
why people prefer housing assets over financial assets due to the difference in their 
respective marginal propensity to consume (MPC). Since housing capital gain has higher 
MPC, households tend to hold more housing assets than financial assets. In their model, 
the consumption of housing is netted out of total consumption. 
Benjamin and Chinloy (2008) find that by refinancing housing equity, households 
in the US are able to get cash to raise consumption expenditure even without lowering net 
wealth. They also claim that consumption is determined by the net wealth instead of 
10 
 
assets level. Therefore, when interest rate is low, households can increase their mortgage 
level to smooth consumption. 
If a household is liquidity-constrained, refinancing becomes a financial buffer. 
For example, under negative income shocks, households would use part of their housing 
assets to smooth their consumption (Hurst, 2004). If a household with low level of liquid 
assets experienced an unemployment shock, the owner has 25% more probability to 
refinance than other households.  
 
The Case of Indonesia 
The general conclusion of several papers that studied the impact of financial crisis 
in Indonesia is that the crisis lowered households‘ standard of living. Compared to the 
survey data in 1997 and 1998, both per capita expenditure (by 25%) and total expenditure 
(by 10%) for household decreased after the crisis. For both rural and urban families, the 
share of food budget in total expenditure increased rapidly owing to price rise and also 
investment in human capital was reduced. Real wage declined by 40% for urban workers 
which doubled the decline for rural labors (Thomas and Frankerberg, 2005). Households 
had to spend some of their assets in order to meet consumption requirement when both 
income and wealth were reduced; gold was traded frequently to compensate the decline 
in income during this period. In households‘ assets portfolio, the weight of real estate fell 
(Frankerberg, Smith and Thomas, 2003). 
To analyze who have been hurt the most, Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) 
adopted a methodology to analyze the impact of the crisis on household welfare. They 
find that the urban poor fared the worst because they did not possess farm land to provide 
11 
 
basic food consumption, the price of which nearly tripled after the crisis. Urban 
households thus may have had a greater incentive to adjust their housing assets to smooth 
consumption.  
The financial crisis not only brought significant changes in the exchange rate in 
Indonesia, but it also totally disrupted the mortgage market. New mortgage loans 
generated by banks did not resume until 2003 (Hoek-Smit, 2005). The commercial 
banking system was severely affected during the crisis. The total outstanding credit of 
commercial banks dropped from nearly 500,000 billion IDR, to a little above 200,000 
billion IDR in 2000.  Banks lost the capability to perform their roles in the financial 
market until 2004, when the credits started to rise. The failure of the mortgage market is 
evident from the total mortgage credits as a percentage of GDP: in 1997, right before the 
crisis, the rate was 3.12% and in 2000 it was only 1.23% and stayed at a low level until 
2004. All these indicate to a scenario that households may have been unable to consume 
their housing assets by refinancing. Note that since the beginning of the crises, for a long 
period of time, the U.S. witnessed a credit freeze. 
 
The Housing Market Crisis in the U.S. 
Certainly the Indonesian economy is vastly different from that of the U.S. It, 
however, incumbents upon us to at least compare the two economies side by side. No 
matter where it happens, do the behaviors of the financial crises share some essential 
communality? After the burst of the subprime crisis in U.S., Reinhart and Rogoff wrote a 
series of papers to discuss and compare the financial crises of the past. From the sample 
of 66 countries belonging to either high-income or middle income economies, they find 
12 
 
that there were little differences in frequency, duration and quantitative measures of the 
financial crises that were experienced by the countries in these two groups. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008) states that, even though these two groups perform quite differently from a 
macroeconomic standpoint, the banking crises in rich countries and emerging markets 
still share many aspects in common. The amplitude of the decline in real housing price 
and real equity price, as well as the duration of the decline, are similar among observed 
countries.  
The average peak-to-trough decline of real housing price is up to 35% and would 
last around six years following the crash (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). In Indonesia the 
decline persisted after five years and was up to 40% (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). The 
U.S. experiences almost 28% decline to date (Dec. 2010) since May 2007. Aside from the 
decline in housing price, some other economic indicators also showed similar 
movements: the increase of the unemployment rate and the decline in real GDP per 
capita, for instance. The duration of unemployment is relatively shorter in emerging 
market economies whereas the extent of GDP decline is smaller in advanced economies. 
And finally, the collapse in tax revenues drives the government debt to rise rapidly. 
Based on the these observations, the authors conclude that both the rich countries, like the 
U.S, and the developing countries, such as Indonesia, face ―an equal opportunity menace‖ 
in the ―aftermath of financial crises‖. After 2000, the housing market in the U.S. entered 
a period of boom. With the development of the subprime mortgage market and other 
financial innovations, more households, especially those with lower credit scores, had a 
chance to buy a house with little down payment. Meanwhile, the increasing house price 
showed that housing assets became a more profitable and less risky component of the 
13 
 
households‘ asset portfolio. The housing demand was pushed to a high level and a 
persistent housing price increase was observed with an annual growth rate of 8.2% until 
2007. 
Since July 2007, the house prices started to decline sharply millions of houses 
faced the foreclosure. When the housing bubble finally burst, a subprime crisis ensued. 
Meanwhile, the total real personal consumption expenditures started declining after 
sustained increase for several years. The quarterly percentage changes show that personal 
consumption expenditures declined gradually. 
By analyzing the previous financial crisis in Indonesia in 1997 to 1998, we could 
gain valuable insight into current and upcoming U.S. economic situation. 
 
III. Data 
We use Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) to estimate the movement of 
consumption and asset allocation in household level. As a longitudinal survey, it starts in 
1993, and resurveyed in 1997, 2000 and 2007, representing nearly 83% of the Indonesian 
population. The IFLS is a comprehensive multipurpose survey that contains detailed 
demographic, economic and financial information. 
Generally, the assets are divided into two categories: business assets and 
household assets. Business assets (classified as farm and non-farm businesses) are the 
resources used in production activities, from which the households can earn income. 
There are two types of non-business assets: housing and non-housing assets. The housing 
assets are defined as the family‘s dwelling house in which the family members are 
currently residing. Non-housing assets include all other assets that are used neither for 
14 
 
business purpose, nor for owner-occupation. They are identified as financial assets, other 
housing assets, jewelries, farm assets not used for business, vehicles, etc.  
As is true in many other developing countries, Indonesian households hold a 
significant amount of non-housing, non-financial assets. On the average, over the four 
waves, the share of financial assets (defined as savings, certificate of deposit, etc.) is as 
small as 1.64% for urban households. Considering the active gold trade in Indonesia, it is 
necessary to take into account the value of jewelries which includes noble metals, gems, 
etc. We view jewelry as a form of risk free asset due to the informal nature of Indonesian 
economy and its underdeveloped financial system.
76
 
Homeownership is not always well-defined in Indonesia, neither is a home. We 
keep in our sample only urban households since the property rights are better defined in 
the urban areas. Also, we only include households whose homes are well-defined in 
terms of their physical structure. We use the housing characteristics to define a house. For 
instance, a dwelling that does not have running water, sewage and hard-roof is not 
considered as a house.  
The upper part of Table 1.2 presents the shares for different types of assets for 
households in the four waves. All values are real values with base year=2000. Housing 
assets are always the most important component of households‘ total assets, and it is 
nearly at least 60% in all survey years. The direction of change is not the same across 
assets. The share of housing assets continually dropped since 1993, but rose significantly 
in 2007 and almost reached the level before the crisis, when the economy has already 
                                                          
7
 Gold trading is very popular and, in some places, it is easier to have access to a gold trader than a bank. 
After the financial crisis, gold was one of the few assets that did not collapse. Jewelry are less risky than 
financial assets especially during volatile periods (Thomas 2005). It is, therefore, reasonable to consider 
jewelry as an important form of saving. The survey data showed that average share of jewelry is up to 2.7% 
of the total assets among urban households. 
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recovered. All other types of assets experienced the increasing first, then decline 
afterward. Since agricultural production is a traditional industry in Indonesia, people 
living in urban area also possess some farm business assets in their asset portfolio. The 
share of farm business assets increased nearly 31.5% after the crisis due to the food price 
inflation.  
We obtain annual expenditure information from the consumption module. 
Consumption expenditure is the money spent by the household on four types of goods 
and services, namely, food consumption, non-food consumption, education, medical care. 
Total and all other non-food consumption are also considered. The second part of Table 
1.2 shows the consumption patterns of the urban families. All values are in annual real 
(base year=2000) expenditures per capita. In general, the consumption patter does not 
show significant volatility across waves. Food is still a major expenditure for urban 
households, and it constitutes nearly half of the total expenditure. However, when we 
look at the absolute value change of the per capita cost on types of expenditures, it shows 
impressive movement. Food expenditures dropped 12.86% after the economic shock. In 
fact, the expenditure on all types of consumption declined between 1997 and 2000. 
People intended to restrict their daily consumption when experiencing severe economic 
shock. After the recovery in 2007, though food expenditures still failed to catch up the 
level in 2000, all other types of expenditures experienced the spending increasing, 
especially the cost of medical care which shifted up by more than 40%. Table 1.1 
presents the change of different types of consumption over the 4 waves. 
 
IV.  Underlying Model 
16 
 
We use Merton (1969) optimal portfolio allocation model. The household decides 
on the consumption level and asset allocation to maximize lifetime utility. Consumption 
decisions are based on accumulated wealth. Total household wealth,            
(1) RNHHW  ,  
which is the sum of the value of the owner occupied housing assets (H), the value of  
non-housing assets (NH), which includes farm business assets, non-farm business assets 
and non-owner-occupied housing assets, and the value of risk free assets (R) that is 
composed of savings accounts and jewelry. Both housing and non-housing assets are 
considered risky.   
We assume that total household wealth is an Ito process such that, 
(2) cdtrRdtNHdzNHdtHdzHdtdW NHNHNHHHH   , 
where, },|{ NHHkzk   are Brownian motions and c  represents household consumption. 
The vector ),( HH   represents the rate of return on and the volatility of housing assets 
H. Correspondingly ),( NHNH   represents the rate of return on and the volatility of non-
housing assets NH. Risk free rate of return is r. We allow the covariance between the 
Brownian motions related to the two risky assets to be non-zero and assume the 
following: 
(3.1) dtdtdzdz NHHNHHNHNHHHNHH ),(),(),(),cov(   , 
(3.2) dzdz NHHHH ),(  , 
(3.3) dzdz NHHNHNH ),(  . 
Denoting the share of the assets H  and NH  as WHwH /  and WNHwNH /
respectively, and substitute them into (2) with (3.2) and (3.3), we have, 
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(4) ( ) ( )
(1 )
H H H H H NH NH NH NH NH
H NH
dW w Wdt w W dz w Wdt w W dz
r w w Wdt cdt
          
   
 
The household‘s life time utility is, 
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in which   is the constant relative risk aversion parameter. The Bellman equation is, 
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where, V  is the value function with V  and V   denoting its first and second derivatives 
with respect to the state variable, respectively. λ is the time discount factor. 
The solution takes the form, 
(7) AWc  , 
where, A is some constant. We can also obtain closed form expressions of the optimal 
asset shares,  
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Additionally, in light of (8.1) and (8.2), we recast the consumption equation as, 
(9)   ),,,,,,,( Arrfc NHHNHH 
. 
We use log-linear approximations of equations (9), (8.1) and (8.2) as our 
estimation equations. From (8.1) and (8.2), we see that asset shares are determined 
simultaneously. Our variables of interest are the housing asset variables ),( HH  . We 
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will examine the reaction of consumption expenditures and share of housing assets (and 
non-housing assets) in response to housing value appreciation, depreciation and volatility. 
A description of the variables in these regressions is reported in Table 1.3. Summary 
statistics are presented in Table 1.4. 
 
V.  Estimation and Findings 
We calculate house value appreciation (depreciation) and house value fluctuations 
from the self-reported house values. We believe that this house value is likely to be 
endogenous for at least two reasons: first, in an economy like Indonesia where the 
financial institutions are poor, self-reporting can have measurement errors.
87
Secondly, 
households consumption behavior may be correlated with their reporting of house values 
due to unobserved characteristics (such as optimism – those who are more optimistic by 
nature may consume more and report higher house values).  
Motivated by the fact that house values vary over the housing characteristics and 
geographical locations, we device an alternative way to arrive at an estimate of house 
values. Self-reported house value is regressed on a series of housing character and 
location variables. The housing characters are collected in detail, and describe the 
physical condition of houses that are the determining factors of price in the housing 
market. For example, a house is likely to be valued higher with a well-kept yard and 
lower with poor ventilation. Also, the number of rooms is an important determinant of 
price, an extra room may contribute nearly 0.1 million IDR based on our estimation. The 
location of house is another factor; in our estimation, keeping all other conditions fixed, if 
                                                          
8
 We assume a simple linear measure error structure that can be addressed using linear instrumental 
variables. 
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a house is located in the most populous province of Indonesia, West Java, then the 
average price will be 0.7 million IDR higher than the ones in other provinces. From our 
first stage of estimation we predict a quality and location adjusted house values. The 
house characteristics are excluded in the second stage where we estimate the 
consumption and asset share equations. 
The household‘s reaction to the change in house values may depend on the 
direction of this change. We, therefore, define the following variables to distinguish 
house value appreciation from depreciation, 
(10) 


 

otherwise,0
0if, HH
H

 ,      and,     


 

otherwise,0
0if, HH
H

 , 
where, 
H  measures the percentage change in quality and location adjusted house values 
between two adjacent waves of the survey. To calculate the local house values volatility, 
we calculate the standard deviation of the quality and location adjusted house value at the 
Kabupaten level which reflects the movement of housing price in regencies. There are 99 
Kabupatens belonging to 13 provinces.  
The level of debts the household carries reflects its attitude towards risk. Debts 
can also influence the households‘ portfolio allocation (Becker and Shabani, 2010). 
However, our dataset did not provide any debt information. In reporting asset values the 
household under-reported their debts. We assume that households borrow at the risk-free 
rate and use the self-reported risk-free assets to estimate the following variables: 
probability of being a debtor; this we use to create a variable called ‗debt‘ indicating the 
probability of the household‘s net risk-free holding being negative. We also regress the 
self-reported risk-free assets values on household‘s financial and demographic 
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characteristics and predict risk-free asset holdings. In these two first stage estimations we 
use variables indicating whether the household is involved in non-farm businesses and 
farm businesses. These variables are excluded in the second stage where we estimate the 
consumption and asset share equations. We use these two variables in our second stage 
estimations. 
 
Consumption Expenditure 
We estimate (9) with the following log-linear approximation,  
(11)  
,
lnlnlnlnlnlnln 6,5,4,3,2,10
iti
itNHitNHitHitHitHit rc



 
7Xβ
 
where i  is the unobserved household characteristics, and it  is the error term. To proxy 
for (A,φ), we use a vector X  of household‘s demographic characteristics, location 
variable, and the economic shocks to the household: household size, age, age
2
, schooling, 
female, a location dummy indicating whether the observation is living in the most 
populous province, an economic shock dummy showing if any household members 
suffered sickness in the past five years, and probability of debt.
98
We estimate (11) for 
each of the following six types of expenditure: total expenditure, food or non-food 
expenditure which is subdivided into additional three categories, medical cost, education 
cost, and other expenditure except food. 
We begin with a set of OLS to estimates of equation (11) under the assumption 
that 0i  (Table 1.5). Table 1.6 presents preferred regressions where we allow for 
0i  and estimate (11) using household fixed effects. The results are similar to the OLS 
                                                          
9
 We include the ‗debt‘ variable as a proxy for the household‘s attitudes towards risk that is part of φ. 
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results. In the fixed effects regressions, when house value appreciates, it has a small 
negative effect on total expenditure, non food and total non food expenditure. Holding 
the other factors at their means, if the rate of return increases by 10%, the total 
expenditure per capita will decline by 0.488%; and the non food expenditure per capita 
will drop by 0.729%. Even though the effect of positive asset return is ambiguous, the 
magnitude is relatively small and does not have a remarkable effect on expenditure. The 
depreciation of the housing asset shows some violation to the non food and total non food 
expenditure. When housing values depreciate by 10%, households will cut their spending 
on non food by 0.593%, and total non food by 0.629%. The effect of housing 
depreciation does not have economically significant effect on expenditure either. In 
general, the expenditures have little obvious movement when facing the value change of 
housing assets. The fluctuation of housing assets does not any impressive effect in any 
cases. Any change of housing assets value, in terms of either rate of return or volatility, 
does not affect household‘s normal expenditure in economically significant level. 
Especially the fluctuation of housing price has no observable impact on consumption 
level at all. We infer that even though the appreciation and depreciation of house values 
may affect consuming in some cases, the magnitudes of these effects are not 
economically significant and, therefore, the collapse of the housing market is not likely to 
hurt expenditure of the individual household. 
The effect of non-housing assets return is significant in five out of six cases. If the 
non-housing market enters a booming period with more positive return, households 
would intend to decrease their daily spending especially the cost of education which is 
nearly 9 times of the decrease of total expenditures. We may assume that the increasing 
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of risky-asset return stimulates people to put more money into investment instead of 
spending it. The volatility of non-housing asset shows zero effect on expenditures. People 
do not take any action on consumption pattern when risky asset market is unstable. 
However, the return on risky-free assets brings positive impact except medical cost.  
The second part of Table 1.8 is the summary of how dependent variables change 
with one positive standard deviation of corresponding independent variables. The total 
expenditure per capita will drop more than 25.45 thousand IDR which is around 25.45 
USD with the current exchange rate when the independent change is one standard 
deviation of housing price appreciation. 
Our results disapprove by Friedman and Levinsohn (2002)‘s finding that urban 
families may adjust housing assets to help their consumption in case of experiencing 
crisis.  
The household heads‘ education level is positively related to the consumption. If 
the heads received at least high school degree, they will spend more, especially on 
education. The age and gender of households head do not present significant effect on 
expenditure decisions.  For larger families, costs per person are lower than smaller 
families. Living in the most populated province is not economically significantly 
expensive. However, probability of owning a debt brings big significant negative impact 
on consumption. If a household increases its chance to own debt by 10%, their personal 
spending will be lowered by more than 14%.  
We also divide the sample into four quartiles by household‘s total expenditure and 
examine if any quartile of total households has special reaction to the change of housing 
assets‘ return and volatility. The households in last quartile have negative response of 
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education costs to the depreciation of housing assets, and the third quartile increase 
spending in non-food expenditure when housing is appreciated. There is no other 
significant responses other that those. Table A1.1 of appendix depicts the results.  
 
Asset Allocation 
We estimate the following log-linear approximations of equations (8.1) and (8.2), 
the asset share equations, 
(12) 
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We test two alternative models. First, we assume 0i . To account for the 
simultaneity bias of we employ three stages least square (3SLS) regression for the pair of 
equations. On RHS, the lagged dependent variables ( )1(,ln tiHw  in equation (12) and 
)1(,ln tiNHw  in equation (13)) are added. Our second test is with instrumental variables 
(2SLS). Here, we allow for 0i  and employ instrumental variables (2SLS) with 
household fixed effects. We use the lagged values of the corresponding share variables as 
instruments to capture the effect from previous period. We produce identification tests 
showing the instruments to be non-weak. 
According to the regression results in Table 1.7, neither the appreciation nor the 
depreciation of housing assets alters the shares of assets with economically insignificant 
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amount with 3SLS method; but both have positive effect on the share of non-housing 
assets when controlling fixed effects. In risky-asset market, its positive return will drive 
the share of housing assets rising by more than 0.78% with both methods; whereas its 
fluctuation changes nothing.  The stability of housing market fails to change the 
percentage of housing assets. Therefore, after the crash of housing market, we can‘t 
observe the obvious change of housing assets in asset portfolio. Paradoxically, if the 
crash occurs in non-housing market, people would like to hold more shares of non-
housing assets instead. 
The older household heads may increase the share of non-housing assets but 
lower housing assets a little bit. And higher-educated heads would like to hold more 
shares of risky-assets. Finally, it is clear that the substitute effect of one type of assets to 
the other exists. Holding other variables unchanged, the direction of housing assets 
change is exactly opposite to non-housing assets.  
In households‘ assets portfolio, the weight of real estate fell (Frankenberg, Smith 
and Thomas, 2003). We do not find that the factor that contributed to the asset shares 
reallocation do not include house value fluctuations and volatilities. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
A great number of empirical studies show that when facing asset value 
appreciation people hold more shares of assets with higher rate of return, and increase 
their expenditure by consuming a fraction of the asset premium, especially housing 
assets. By studying the case in Indonesia for the period 1993-2007, we intend to test the 
sensitivity of household‘s decision regarding consumption and asset allocation in 
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response to large house value fluctuations. Also, we want to examine if the household‘s 
response is symmetrically opposite in case of house value appreciation and depreciation. 
The regression results show that housing asset value depreciation have little impact on 
consumption expenditures. Its effect on asset allocation, especially share of housing 
assets, is not economically significant. Elasticity with respect to housing asset volatility is 
positive for total expenditure, food and non-food cost, having no effect for the share of 
non-housing assets. However, the magnitudes of these elasticities are very small and not 
economically significant. We conclude that changes in rate of return and volatility of 
housing asset values are not contributing to changes in household consumption 
expenditures in any significant way, as well as in the asset allocation.  
Since July 2007, house prices in U.S. started to decline sharply. The U.S. National 
Housing Price Index kept dropping sharply and was as low as 129 in the first quarter of 
2009, which is around 30% lower than what it was two years earlier.
109
The quarterly 
percentage changes show that personal consumption expenditures also 
declined.
1110
Decrease of house values is accompanied by consumption restraint. For most 
families, housing assets are one of the major components in their asset portfolio. In 2009, 
the GDP growth rate was only -2.6%, and the unemployment rate as high as 8.9%. In the 
first quarter of 2010, GDP growth was 3.7% compared to previous quarter and 
unemployment still remains as high as 9.7%. The economy has clearly not fully 
recovered. We still would not know for at least some time the full extent of the impact of 
                                                          
10
 The U.S. National Home Price Index in 2007(Q1), 2008(Q1), 2009(Q1) and 2010(Q1) were 184.83, 
159.36, 129.18 and 132.10 respectively. Source: S&P/Case-Schiller: 2000Q1=100.  
11
 Total personal consumption expenditure in the U.S. rose at a steady average rate of 2.97% between 2001 
and 2007. Between 2008(Q1) and 2009(Q1) there was a decline of 2.6%, and within the next year the rate 
of change was 3.6%. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (In real values: 
2005=100). 
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the housing market fluctuations on household‘s consumption and asset allocation 
decisions in the U.S.  
However, given the similarities of the economic crisis in Indonesia a decade ago 
and the recent crisis in the U.S., these results, at the very least, raises a question as to 
what extent the collapse of the housing market in the U.S. had a causal effect on the 
decline in consumer expenditures that we are witnessing in the U.S. Unemployment, 
consumer confidence, bleak future expectations, all these may have been more prominent 
contributors to the declining consumer spending. Our study suggests that a causal 
relationship between house value decline and reduced consumer expenditure in the U.S. 
is at this point a mere speculation and we cannot be sure unless we have reasonable 
evidence. 
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Table 1.1 Change across the Four Waves in IFLS* 
 1993-1997 1997-2000 2000-2007 
Percent of houses that saw its value 
appreciate 67.77 34.39 63.77 
Percent of houses that saw its value 
depreciate 32.23 65.61 36.23 
Percentage change in per capita    
 total household expenditure 9.00 -21.96 7.98 
 food expenditure -1.94 -12.86 -8.51 
 total non-food expenditure 18.64 -28.58 22.64 
 education expenditure -23.01 -30.01 20.29 
 medical expenditure 14.34 -21.19 45.32 
 other non-food expenditure 38.02 -28.65 21.75 
*N=1135 
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Table 1.2 Assets allocation and consumption pattern for urban households in IFLS 
 1993 1997 2000 2007 
Share of Total Assets     
 House (%) 66.29 63.15 59.16 65.97 
 Other household Assets (%) 30.73 34.95 38.54 32.06 
 Farm Business (%) 4.99 4.38 7.37 4.87 
 Non-farm Business (%) 4.27 4.48 5.89 4.91 
 Saving (%)  1.45 1.43 1.92 1.40 
 Jewelry (%) 1.53 0.47 0.38 0.56 
Share of Consumption (EPC)     
 Food (%)  52.33 51.68 53.88 46.32 
 Non-food (%) 31.26 34.66 33.64 40.75 
 Medicine (%) 2.17 2.55 2.48 2.91 
 Education (%) 14.23 11.11 10.00 10.02 
N * 426 422 506 207 
*Only the households continuously joint the survey at least three times were selected in 
order to maintain the consistency of the dataset.  The number of observations in each 
wave is different because some households did not participate in all four waves of 
survey. For example, they only fulfilled the first three surveys, or the last three surveys.  
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 1.3 Variable Descriptions 
Variables Description 
Age Age of the household heads. It is restricted between 21 to 75. 
Age
2 
The square of age. 
Female Dummy variable for female headed household. 
Schooling Dummy variable for education of the household heads. It takes the 
value of 1 if the head finished high school education. 
Appreciation and 
depreciation of 
housing assets 
House value appreciation 0if,  HHH   (zero otherwise), 
and depreciation 0if,  HHH   (zero otherwise), where, 
H  is the real rate of return on the housing asset. We measure it 
with the percentage change in real owner occupied house value 
between two subsequent waves of the survey. 
Rate of return on 
non-housing 
assets 
The average of the past five years‘ growth rate of Jakarta Stock 
Exchange.  
Rate of return on 
risk-free assets 
The average of the past five years‘ 12 months real interest rate.  
Share of risk free 
assets 
The risk free assets are both the risk free financial assets (saving, 
deposit, etc.) and jewelry owned by the households.  
Share of non-
housing assets 
The non-housing assets include all business assets and other assets 
owned by the households, except owner occupied house and risk 
free assets. 
Volatility in the 
local housing 
assets market 
Volatility of quality and location adjusted house value volatility 
measure, calculated for each kabupaten, which is the regency level 
lower than province. It captures the volatility of house value at a 
point in time within a given regency. 
Volatility of non-
housing assets 
The average of the past five years‘ growth rate of GDP per for the 
three largest provinces; the average of ten years for other 
provinces. 
Consumption 
Expenditures 
We use six consumption expenditure variables: (a) total household 
expenditure, (b) food expenditure, (c) total non-food expenditure, 
(d) education expenditure, (e) medical expenditure, and (f) other 
non-food expenditure that includes clothing, furniture, etc. 
House 
Characteristics 
A series of variable describes the characteristics of house, 
including the number of rooms in the house, types of house 
(1unite/1 level, 1 unit/multi-level, 2unit/1evel), whether the house 
has drinking water, defecation system, sewage drain, garbage 
dispose, hygienic conditions, ventilation and yard. Such 
characteristics determine the market value of house.  
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(continued) 
Sickness Dummy variable for sickness of any householders. It takes the 
value of 1 if any family member got sick in the past five years. 
Household size Number of adults and children living in the household. 
Province We only use the urban sample because homeownership is not very 
well defined in the rural areas. The households in our sample come 
from 13 provinces. 
Probability of 
owning debt 
Predicted value that how big the chance is that a household own 
debt. 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables* Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
LHS     
Total household expenditure** 308.85 344.90 20.31 5480.72 
Food expenditure 134.98 105.93 2.07 1108.86 
Total non-food expenditure 173.88 300.94 3.14 5365.23 
Education expenditure 33.30 59.93 0.00 833.97 
Medical expenditure 8.54 31.32 0.00 662.76 
Other non-food expenditure 132.03 268.83 2.69 5205.04 
Share of housing assets*** 0.63 0.26 0.00 1.87 
Share of non-housing assets*** 0.36 0.25 0.00 1.38 
RHS     
House value appreciation*** 68.62 519.29 0.00 11694.30 
House value depreciation*** -58.01 714.03 -23364.23 0.00 
Volatility in the local housing asset 
market** 
4859.87 3303.17 74.46 19211.03 
Rate of return on non-housing 
assets 
11.54 13.01 2.00 38.00 
Rate of return on risk-free assets 2.76 3.16 0.02 6.83 
Volatility of non-housing assets 103.58 24.93 82.83 156.74 
Sickness 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Female 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Age 51.82 10.50 27.00 75.00 
Schooling 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Household size 6.42 2.45 1.00 15.00 
Largest Province  0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Housing asset value 6678.95 7805.50 10.00 85000.00 
Non-housing asset value 5779.60 11928.28 2.00 183350.00 
Predicted risk-free asset value 402.97 1498.31 -4136.92 28112.38 
Probability of owning debt 0.66 0.16 0.00 0.97 
*N=1135, Year=1997, 2000, 2007  
**All expenditures per capita, asset value and volatility of housing asset are in terms of 10,000 IDR. All 
values are inflation adjusted using the GDP deflator (2000=100, source: IMF) 
***The asset shares, housing returns in the estimation are from prediction values. 
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Table 1.5 Expenditure OLS Regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Expenditure 
Non Food 
Expenditure 
Education 
Expenditure 
Medical Care 
Expenditure 
Other Non Food 
Expenditure 
αH
+ 
-0.0954*** -0.0683*** -0.127*** -0.108 -0.229*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0231) (0.0984) (0.0766) (0.0223) 
aH
- 
-0.0498*** -0.0370** -0.0817*** -0.155 -0.0507 -0.0770*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0169) (0.0238) (0.0997) (0.0781) (0.0250) 
αNH -0.0329 -0.108*** 0.0527 -0.213 0.488*** 0.0722* 
 (0.0298) (0.0288) (0.0388) (0.204) (0.188) (0.0415) 
R 0.0422*** 0.0471*** 0.0323 0.168** -0.330*** 0.0207 
 (0.0131) (0.0150) (0.0202) (0.0804) (0.0937) (0.0204) 
σH 0.129*** 0.0869*** 0.191*** 0.195 0.0878 0.189*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0251) (0.0319) (0.169) (0.150) (0.0286) 
σNH -0.199 -0.123 -0.221 0.364 0.695 -0.220 
 (0.125) (0.119) (0.151) (0.666) (0.752) (0.182) 
HHsize -0.0719*** -0.0682*** -0.0690*** 0.306*** -0.0165 -0.0768*** 
 (0.00729) (0.00736) (0.0101) (0.0533) (0.0411) (0.0108) 
Largest Province -0.0845* -0.00239 -0.124** -0.0599 0.341 -0.122* 
 (0.0502) (0.0494) (0.0627) (0.284) (0.286) (0.0639) 
Age 0.0237 0.0231 0.0286 0.104 0.0996 -0.00267 
 (0.0155) (0.0169) (0.0190) (0.103) (0.0930) (0.0184) 
Age
2
 -0.000293** -0.000293* -0.000357* -0.00259** -0.000752 -3.88e-05 
 (0.000143) (0.000161) (0.000182) (0.00102) (0.000865) (0.000174) 
Schooling 0.250*** 0.198*** 0.320*** 0.801*** -0.315 0.326*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0451) (0.0547) (0.269) (0.280) (0.0665) 
Female 0.0552 -0.0115 0.0414 -1.088* -0.595 0.103 
 (0.0843) (0.0806) (0.111) (0.605) (0.403) (0.124) 
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(continued) 
Sickness 0.00332 -0.0740 0.0255 -0.179 1.807*** -0.107 
 (0.0684) (0.0626) (0.0730) (0.331) (0.319) (0.0757) 
Debt -1.414*** -0.595*** -1.997*** -2.138** -2.103*** -1.983*** 
 (0.169) (0.131) (0.229) (0.902) (0.596) (0.242) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.325*** 4.527*** 3.749*** -2.244 -8.025 4.150*** 
 (0.907) (0.842) (1.037) (5.613) (5.181) (1.200) 
Observations 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135 
R-squared 0.374 0.230 0.371 0.257 0.065 0.343 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.6 Expenditure Fixed Effect Regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Expenditure 
Non Food 
Expenditure 
Education 
Expenditure 
Medical 
Care 
Expenditure 
Other Non 
Food 
Expenditure 
αH
+ 
-0.0488** -0.0227 -0.0729*** -0.105 -0.154 -0.0815** 
 (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0264) (0.132) (0.148) (0.0339) 
aH
- 
-0.0215 -0.000525 -0.0593** -0.203 -0.0514 -0.0629** 
 (0.0211) (0.0185) (0.0256) (0.126) (0.127) (0.0300) 
αNH -0.139*** -0.194*** -0.0816* -1.296*** 0.448* -0.0163 
 (0.0330) (0.0454) (0.0470) (0.260) (0.257) (0.0472) 
R 0.0779*** 0.0746*** 0.0845*** 0.629*** -0.227 0.0489** 
 (0.0169) (0.0219) (0.0285) (0.133) (0.148) (0.0249) 
σH -0.00896 -0.0729 0.0790 0.178 0.345 0.0764 
 (0.0484) (0.0750) (0.0717) (0.419) (0.372) (0.0692) 
σNH -0.149 -0.107 -0.175 -0.625 0.000665 0.0212 
 (0.180) (0.220) (0.347) (1.372) (1.523) (0.293) 
HHsize -0.0278 -0.0641** 0.0107 0.512** 0.182 -0.00471 
 (0.0217) (0.0254) (0.0318) (0.201) (0.150) (0.0371) 
Sickness -0.0268 -0.0937 -0.0529 -0.266 0.944** -0.107 
 (0.0450) (0.0589) (0.0733) (0.378) (0.428) (0.0779) 
Debt -0.553*** -0.250 -0.968*** -1.581 -3.442*** -0.966*** 
 (0.161) (0.179) (0.282) (1.566) (1.173) (0.309) 
Constant 7.255*** 7.496*** 5.063** 1.819 -6.540 3.827** 
 (1.170) (1.685) (2.149) (8.022) (9.697) (1.614) 
Observations 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135 1135 
R-squared 0.134 0.122 0.098 0.087 0.037 0.076 
Number of HHs 506 506 506 506 506 506 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.7 Asset Shares 3SLS Regression 
 
 3SLS  IV Fixed Effect 
VARIABLES 
Hw  NHw   Hw  NHw  
Lagged Hw  0.288***     
 (0.068)     
NHw  -0.280***   -0.336***  
 (0.068)   (0.0897)  
αH
+ 
0.003 0.037  0.0205 0.0636** 
 (0.011) (0.024)  (0.0218) (0.0260) 
aH
- 
-0.008 0.016  0.0221 0.0598** 
 (0.013) (0.020)  (0.0280) (0.0292) 
αNH 0.086*** -0.074  0.0786** 0.0640 
 (0.018) (0.052)  (0.0384) (0.0459) 
R -0.004 -0.020  -0.0193 -0.0662** 
 (0.012) (0.029)  (0.0210) (0.0324) 
σH 0.001 -0.020  0.00583 -0.0711 
 (0.024) (0.031)  (0.0470) (0.0725) 
σNH -0.106 0.511***  0.308 0.774** 
 (0.114) (0.184)  (0.226) (0.335) 
HHsize 0.016** 0.001  -0.00165 -0.0337 
 (0.006) (0.011)  (0.0283) (0.0328) 
Age -0.047*** 0.051**    
 (0.013) (0.025)    
Age
2
 0.000*** -0.001**    
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Schooling -0.012 0.199***    
 (0.043) (0.050)    
Female 0.058 -0.086    
 (0.055) (0.109)    
Largest Province -0.005 -0.015    
 (0.052) (0.069)    
Lagged NHw   0.337***    
  (0.050)    
Hw   -0.148   -0.852*** 
  (0.205)   (0.329) 
Constant 0.620 -4.189***  -2.838* -4.411* 
 (0.981) (1.384)  (1.455) (2.278) 
Observations 1135 1135  1,135 1,135 
R-squared 0.437 0.352  506 506 
Notes: (a) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  (b) wH= share of 
housing assets, wNH= share of non-housing assets. (c) Stock Yogo critical value: 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% 
maximal IV size values are 16.38, 8.96, 6.66 and 5.53 respectively. Sargan test: equation is exactly 
identified. 
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Table 1.8 Responsiveness (% changes) 
 
  10% Positive change 
% change Model αH
+
 αH
-
 σH αNH σNH R %H %NH 
Total Expenditure Fixed effect -0.49 0 0 -1.39 0 0.78   
Food Expenditure Fixed effect 0 0 0 -1.94 0 0.75   
Non Food Expenditure Fixed effect -0.73 -0.59 0 -0.82 0 0.85   
Education Expenditure Fixed effect 0 0 0 -12.96 0 6.29   
Medical Care Expenditure Fixed effect 0 0 0 4.48 0 0   
Other Non Food Expenditure Fixed effect -0.82 -0.63 0 0 0 0.49   
Share of Housing Asset System 3SLS 0 0 0 0.86 0 0 - -2.80 
Share of Non-Housing Asset System 3SLS 0 0 0 0 5.11 0 0 - 
Share of Housing Asset IV fixed effect 0 0 0 0.79 0 0 - -3.36 
Share of Non-Housing Asset IV fixed effect 0.64 0.60 0 0 7.74 -0.66 -8.52 - 
  One Std. deviation 
% change  αH
+
 αH
-
 σH αNH σNH R %H %NH 
Total Expenditure Fixed effect -25.45 0.00 0 -1.81 0 0.25   
Food Expenditure Fixed effect 0 0.00 0 -2.52 0 0.24   
Non Food Expenditure Fixed effect -37.91 -42.13 0 -1.07 0 0.27   
Education Expenditure Fixed effect 0 0 0 -16.86 0 1.99   
Medical Care Expenditure Fixed effect 0 0 0 5.83 0 0   
Other Non Food Expenditure Fixed effect -42.58 -44.98 0 0 0 0.15   
Share of Housing Asset System 3SLS 0 0 0 1.12 0 0 - -0.07 
Share of Non-Housing Asset System 3SLS 0 0 0 0 12.74 0 0 - 
Share of Housing Asset IV fixed effect 0 0 0 1.03 0 0 - -0.08 
Share of Non-Housing Asset IV fixed effect 33.23 42.84 0 0 19.30 -0.21 -0.22 - 
    *Note: (a) N=1135, (b) Std. deviation is in 10,000 IDR. 
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Appendix 
Table A1.1 Estimates by Expenditure Quartiles 
 Expenditure Quartiles   
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Model 
Total consumption expenditure Fixed effect 
αH
+
 0.0134 0.00508 -0.0191 -0.0071  
aH
-
 -0.00959 0.00441 -0.0363 0.00323  
σH 0.0615 -0.0616 0.0426 -0.0286  
Food Fixed effect 
αH
+
 0.0344 -0.0155 0.0173 -0.0647  
aH
-
 0.00569 -0.0072 0.00916 0.0219  
σH 0.0995 -0.184 0.02 0.0389  
Non-food Fixed effect 
αH
+
 -0.0159 0.0228 -0.116 0.0418  
aH
-
 -0.0106 0.0211 -0.174 -0.0154  
σH 0.048 0.173 0.153 0.00943  
Education Fixed effect 
αH
+
 -0.111 0.00319 0.589 -1.562***  
aH
-
 0.0582 -0.287 -0.574 -1.037**  
σH 0.529 1.3 -2.499 2.384  
Medical Fixed effect 
αH
+
 -0.193 -0.441 0.161 0.381  
aH
-
 -0.0612 -0.516 0.42 -0.14  
σH -0.456 -0.496 0.551 -0.21  
Other non-food Fixed effect 
αH
+
 -0.00594 0.0398 -0.196*** 0.018  
aH
-
 -0.0142 0.0482 -0.179 0.0339  
σH 0.0587 0.108 0.18 0.0306  
Share of housing assets System 
3SLS 
αH
+
 -0.002 0.034 -0.040 0.008 
 aH
-
 -0.006 0.012 -0.067** -0.010 
 σH -0.074** 0.049 0.013 0.042 
 Share of housing assets IV fixed 
effect 
αH
+
 0.0169 0.0710 -0.0280 -0.00328 
 aH
-
 0.0166 0.0359 -0.0786** -0.0256 
 σH -0.0805** 0.0262 -0.0135 0.0558 
 
40 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
SOCIAL VALUES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SOCIAL VALUES AND FORMAL 
FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In a wide variety of studies, social trust has been shown to have significant effects on 
economic growth and development by improving the scope and efficiency of non-market 
transactions. Trust can create alternative sources of finance to firms when formal finance 
is scarce or entails large transaction costs (as is typically true in economies with less 
developed financial systems). As an important component of GDP, exports can also be 
expected to benefit from trust. Exporting firms not only confront higher transaction costs 
(mainly owing to their nature of markets) but can also face tighter financial constraints 
compared to firms focusing exclusively on the domestic market. Exporting involves 
several upfront costs for which liquidity constraint can become a serious impediment as 
shown in Manova (2008a).  
With this background, we examine the effect of trust in two dimensions: trust in 
people in general and trust in family and friends. We hypothesize that high levels of trust  
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in an economy with relatively less developed formal sources of finance can have positive 
effect on exports as informal institutions can offer alternative sources of finance. Using 
the World Values Survey (WVS) and the UN Comtrade data for the period 1994-2007, 
we find that in countries with lower level of financial development, trust has a positive 
and significant effect on the value of exports. The analysis at two and three digit level not 
only allows us to control for industry level heterogeneity but also mitigates concerns of 
endogeneity. This is because with two and three digit industry level trade values, 
financial market attributes may be viewed as exogenous which are set at economy wide 
level. 
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I. Introduction 
Social values underlie important elements of a wide range of social resources, such as 
network, relationship among people, social ties and connections and social activities 
among others. Social values, in general, not only exist in our daily life but also can exert 
have significant effect on economic activities and outcomes. In this paper we focus on 
two prominent aspects of social values: trust in people and attitude towards friends and 
family (in particular, how important people believe family and friends are), hitherto 
referred as ‗trust in people‘ and trust in ‗family and friends‘. .  
Trust can affect economic activities through several channels. Trust reflects 
people‘s general judgment and evaluation on others as well as country‘s social 
environment. Trust in family and friends reflect, among other things, strength of close-
knit social networks. Trust plays a role in many aspects of economic behaviors and often 
works as one of basic ingredients underlying an economic decision. In this research, we 
examine the role of trust in international trade, and try to estimate the underlying 
financial impact of trust on trade flows. 
In recent times, the role of trust in economic performance has attracted a great 
deal of attention. A number of studies find trust to be positively correlated with economic 
performance. Boulila, Bousrih and Mohamed (2008) find that, apart from a positive 
correlation between trust and growth, trust has an indirect effect on economic activities 
through institutional development. Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that economic 
performance is highly correlated with trust and civic cooperation. Josten (2004) find that 
for long-run economic success, trust and mutual cooperation are important factors.  
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The role of trust has been examined in many empirical works, most notably in 
economic development. Higher level of trust reduces friction among participants, saves 
time and capital on collecting information and doing business. As Knack and Keefer 
(1997) suggest, higher-trust societies have lower transaction cost, and trading agents do 
not have to invest more resources to protect themselves from unexpected losses, because 
they can rely on the protection from trustable formal and informal institutions. 
Meanwhile, firms could reallocate resources to other aspects such as innovation instead 
of trade protection and meeting their transaction cost requirements.   
Trust, by lowering transaction costs, can also improve economic performance by 
providing more channels to access working capital. Intuitively, such financial effects can 
be assumed to be more important for countries with lower level of financial development 
where the formal institutions are not well developed to meet the credit needs. Trust can, 
to varying extent, fill in for limitations in the formal sector and institutions and be an 
important source of informal credit.  
Until now, most of the studies focus on the effect of trust on economic 
development. Globally as markets are becoming more integrated, production and 
consumption levels in the domestic market are not sufficient to reflect a country‘s 
economic status and size. Exports grew to be as much as 20% of the world‘s GDP in 
1999 and this share has been rising. As openness of developing countries in particular has 
increased over time, the financial needs of the exporting sector have risen alongside. 
Trust (within the exporting country) can be important for trade through several 
channels. First, with higher levels of trust, it is less expensive to achieve desired 
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information, and process transaction or business activities. There is also the social 
network aspect of trust, especially in family and friends.  
There are several factors (owing to moral hazard, adverse selection, etc.) where 
trust among trading partners could play important roles. Given the strong role of 
asymmetric information, the role of social networks spanning the trading partners has 
been widely studied following the pioneering work by Rauch (1999). Other works along 
these lines include Epstein and Gang (2004) and Rauch (2001).  
In Rauch (2001) the role of social networks (defined by ethnic ties across borders) 
is shown to  mitigate some informal trade barriers that are ubiquitous  in international 
trade flows such as problems of enforcement of international contracts, availability of 
sufficient information, etc. Rauch (2002) finds that because of the large and widespread 
population of overseas Chinese, ethnic Chinese networks have a significant effects on 
bilateral trades.  
It is reasonable to assume that the establishment of ethnic networks is highly 
correlated with trust among people who share the same language, cultural background, 
and nationality. Epstein and Gang (2004) provide detailed discussion about ethnic 
networks and international trade. Migrants have advantages in doing international trade, 
because they try to be assimilated in the host country natives, as well as keep in touch 
with home country. Both the host and home country networks play an important role in 
bilateral trades. 
Our focus in this research is trust within an exporting country and its impact on its 
trade. The trust measures used in this analysis, arguably, reflects people‘s general 
judgment and evaluation on others as well as country‘s social environment as well as the 
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strength of close-knit social networks. There could be several pathways through which 
trust in an exporting country could play a role in international trade. While we do not 
want to rule out the possibility that several correlated channels could be at work such as 
insurance the degree of which could vary positively with trust, our identification strategy 
focuses on one of the important channels, the credit channel.  
Little research exists on the association between trust in a country and 
international trade. Some of the work that does exist looks at the causality from trade to 
trust rather than the converse. Thus papers such as Rodrik (1997) argue that trade 
openness may lower the trust of a society and lead to social ―disintegration‖. By using the 
volume of trade as a measure of market openness, Chan (2007) empirically rejects this 
hypothesis, and shows that the trade openness does not hurt trust level; it actually 
enhances social values (trust) and strengthens the power of informal institutions.  
To the best of our knowledge, the issue of the effect of trust (within a country) on 
trade has not been studied. This paper aims wants to contribute to the literature by 
estimating the effect of the state of trust within an exporting country on the level of 
exports. In light of the studies mentioned above that discuss the effect of trade on trust, 
we are aware of the potential feedback effects. By doing the analysis of bilateral (as 
opposed to aggregate trade) at the disaggregated two and three digit industry level, we 
mitigate the concern of endogeneity. It is unlikely that the trade flow of an individual 
industry disaggregated at the two-digit or three-digit levels with specific country can 
exert a significant effect on the trust levels in the entire economy. We, therefore, 
disaggregate the data at the industry level and look at effects on trade at country pair level 
to lessen the concerns of reverse causality. 
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Our focus on credit market links is motivated by findings in studies such as 
Manova (2010). Amiti and Weisnstein (2009) argue that because of the credit default 
risks and time lags during the process of international trade, exporters require more 
financial support from banks, especially trade credits, than other producers. Generally, 
the average period of completing an international trade contract is extended due to 
reasons such as distance, different requirements of documents in exporting and importing 
countries, etc. Long trading time decreases the efficiency of capital flow and increases 
the risk of claiming initial investment. Meanwhile, unfamiliarity with foreign markets 
increases the default risk. If trading partner refuses to execute contracts it is more 
difficult, compared to the domestic market, to recover through collaterals or enforce 
punishment.  
High capital demand and high riskiness in contract make the price of credit 
expensive for firms trading across border. Exporters or importers may have to pay higher 
capital price in order to receive their desired amount of credits. This price in principle 
could vary depending upon the identity of the trading partner. 
Manova (2008b) shows that financial constraints are an important factor 
determining international trade flows in a setting of Melitz (2003) where there are fixed 
costs of exporting and there is firm hetergeneity. Using firm-level evidence, Manova, 
Wei and Zhang (2009) confirm the results that, it is not only trade volumes (the intensive 
margin) but also the trading destinations (the extensive margin) that are restricted by 
credit constraints; whereas foreign owned or jointly owned firms can export more 
because they have wider access to capital resources. This linkage invokes an alternative 
channel because of which financial constraints could vary across trading partners. 
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Overall, the findings are that with higher levels of financial development trade flows 
increase (Manova 2008a, Berthou 2007).   
This paper corroborates the findings in Manova (2008a) and Berthou (2007) to the 
extent that finance matters for trade but the focus here is on substitution between formal 
and informal sources of finance where the latter is assumed to be more dependent on 
social trust. Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that poorer countries in particular could 
benefit more from higher trust level in that they do not possess well-developed financial 
system and reliable legal institution as many developed countries do. We take this line of 
reasoning and put to test in the context of international trade. 
We use panel data from 78 countries ranging for the period 1994 to 2007. The 
trust measures come from the three waves of the World Value Surveys (WVS). The trade 
information comes from the UN Comtrade data. The information on formal finance 
comes from World Development Indicators (WDI). 
We use a modified gravity model to estimate the cross-country and cross-sector 
effect of trust on international exports. The effect of trust is assumed to be less important 
in countries with developed sources of formal credit. Conversely, firms in countries with 
less inadequate sources of formal credit would likely make use of informal sources which 
relies on trust and would therefor affect trade. Therefore, we will adopt an empirical 
specification that invokes this identification channel for the role of trust in covering for 
lack of formal credit. Note that the availability of formal credit is measured by the 
domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP, a measure used by a 
number of previous studies (Manova 2008a; Berthou, 2007; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
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In addition to country-pair specific information, we also introduce exporter, 
importer and time fixed effects in our estimation to capture the role of unobservable fixed 
factors. Exporter and importer fixed effects are included to account for multilateral 
resistance following Anderson and vanWincoop (2003) who suggest their importance in a 
proper specification of the gravity model. Feenstra (2004) shows that coefficients in a 
gravity model can be consistently estimated if importer and exporter fixed effects are 
used to capture the effect of the multilateral resistance terms.  
Furthermore, we conduct the analysis at the disaggregated two and three digit 
level of ISIC (Revision 3) product code list from UN Comtrade database. Considering the 
unique characteristics of each type of product, this level of analysis allows us to control 
for industry level unobserved factors. 
As a robustness check we repeat the analysis on a subsample that excludes China. 
This is because China is a very large trading country with a mixed economy in terms of 
formal and informal sectors. China accounted for as much as 10% of the world‘s export 
value in 2009. Both the product varieties and destinations for China are relatively large in 
each wave compared to the other exporters. By removing it from the original dataset, we 
can test if our hypothesis is still generalized across all other countries without the 
intensive power of China.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the previous studies about 
trust, especially trust and economic growth, trade, financial development level and other 
related issues. Section III introduces the data we use for the estimation. Section IV 
presents the model and regression results. Section V concludes.  
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II. Literature Reviews 
A number of studies have examined the relationship between trust and economic 
growth. Broadly, the consensus is that advanced social relationships positively affect 
economic growth. Josten (2004), Chou (2005), Boulila, Bousrih and Trabelsi (2008), and 
Castano (2007) all present empirical evidence of the existence of positive effect of trust 
on economic growth. Nonetheless, the extents of such effects, i.e. the estimated 
magnitudes, vary across studies.
11
  
Knack and Keefer (1997) pioneered the research on the effect of higher trust level 
and civic norms on enhancing economic growth. In a society in which people trust each 
other, individuals spend less time and resources in business transactions, especially in the 
trust-sensitive businesses; with higher trust, people do not need to incur extra costs to 
protect themselves since they are in a relatively safe environment. With capital saved 
from self-protection and transaction, they can put it into investment activities that 
eventually increase economic growth. Their empirical results not only show the 
significant effect of trust on aggregate economic activity, but also provide evidence that 
poorer countries in particular could benefit more from higher trust level in that they do 
not possess well-developed financial system and reliable legal institution as many 
developed countries do.  
                                                          
11
 Trust has long been recognized as a critical dimension of ―social capital‖ that is formed by authority, 
trust, norms (Coleman, 1990, pp300-301), and social networks (Knack and Keefer, 1997). As one of 
fundamental resources of production input (Knack and Keefer, 1997), social capital interacts with both 
physical and human capital and thus enhances the benefits of those two capital investments (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997). Through this channel, the effect of trust on economic growth and development is 
conceptualized. However, social capital being an ill defined concept, we believe that the concept of trust is 
more precise and the use of trust alone in our analysis much more meaningful. 
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Zak and Knack (2001) agree with the idea that high trust could reduce the cost of 
investigating brokers, and also examine the influence of trust on investment rate and 
income growth rate. In the model, trust is explained as the time taken to complete the 
production activity. In Zak and Knack (2001) trust is determined by ―social economic and 
institutional environments‖. For example, societies with more equal income exhibit 
higher trust; homogeneous societies have higher levels of trust; whereas trust level 
decreases as discrimination rises. The prediction is that if trust grows up in these 
circumstances, growth and investment rate will increase simultaneously. The empirical 
results generally support the hypothesis. For instance, investment/GDP share shifts up by 
1% with a 7% increase in trust.  
Subsequently, while several studies have extended the research in the two papers 
discussed above along different dimensions, Beugelsdijk, Groot and Schaik (2004) 
improve upon the data limitations in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) 
and perform robustness checks of the relationship between trust and growth. By using 
new econometric methods, adding additional controls for the omitted variables in the two 
papers, and extending the size of the dataset, they reveal that in most dimensions, the 
results are robust. Furthermore, Berggren, Elinder and Jordahl (2008) continue this study 
and work on the case excluding outliers. They claim that even though the robustness of 
trust-growth relationship is strong in previous studies, without some outliers, such as 
China and Ireland, both the coefficient and effective size of trust is much smaller. 
Removing China from the sample, the estimated effect of trust is nearly half the original 
figure. It alerts us that the outliers may change the estimation significantly. We draw 
upon this result and perform the robustness check with the exclusion of China which, in 
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analysis of trust and trade through the pathway of substitution between formal and 
informal institutions, could be disproportionately important.   
Dearmon and Grier (2009) summarize four ways to examine how trust fosters 
economic development. First of all, it could directly have an impact on growth; secondly, 
trust reduces the transaction costs and increases profits correspondingly; thirdly, trust 
raises the rate of physical capital accumulation; finally, human capital becomes more 
efficient with the interaction of trust. In their cross-sectional study, they use GDP per 
capita as an indicator of growth, and find a direct positive effect of trust, as well as 
indirect effects which improve the human capital‘s performance on growth. For example, 
GDP per capita will increase by 2.4% if the trust level changes one standard deviation 
upward. 
As discussed above, international trade accounts for almost 25% of the world 
GDP in recent years. It should thus be natural to ask if trust affects trade. Though there 
do not exist studies examining the effect of ―trust‖ on trade, effect of social networks on 
trade have been investigated. These studies often focus on measures of bilateral networks 
across trading partners. In contrast, this paper focuses on societal trust in the exporting 
country and its effect on aggregate exports as well as bilateral trade flows.    
Intuitively, stronger social networks can be facilitated if people trust each other. A 
trusting environment is conducive to stronger and more effective social networks. An 
appreciation and positive attitude toward family and friends is yet another aspect of social 
values that alludes to stronger social networks. 
Rauch (2001) investigates the role of social networks in international trade in 
detail. Usually there exist some informal trade barriers blocking bilateral trade flows, for 
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instance, problem of enforcement in international contracts, lack of information, etc. 
Social networks and transnational business help lower the barriers and increase 
international trade from several aspects. When facing enforcement problem in contracts, 
social networks will degrade the credit, or trust level of trading partners. Social network 
can also transfer the information about agents‘ characteristics, and increase the 
opportunities for both sellers and buyers to find matched partners. As intermediaries, 
social networks help those agents who cannot access the trade market directly, transfer 
the information in two directions, and eventually make international trade more efficient 
as well. In this situation, goods and services can be allocated in a wider range instead of 
limited members. These requirements such as information vary across product 
characteristics and Rauch introduces the concept of homogeneous and differentiated 
products to identify the effects of networks where the latter embodies a greater role for 
networks. 
Rauch (1999) separates the products into homogenous and differentiated 
commodities. The former receives weaker returns from networks because they have 
fewer varieties, and do not necessarily need the agents to match special buyers‘ 
requirement costly in foreign market as the latter one do. Rauch (2002) applies this model 
to the case in China. Because of the large and widespread population of overseas 
Chinese, ethnic Chinese networks display significant effects on bilateral trades.  
It is reasonable to assume that the establishment of ethnic networks is highly 
correlated with trust among people who share the same language, cultural background, 
and nationality. Epstein and Gang (2004) provide detailed discussion about ethnic 
networks and international trade. Migrants have advantages in international trade because 
53 
 
they try to be assimilated in the host country as well as keep in touch with home country. 
Both the host and home country networks play an important role in bilateral trades. 
International trade can be benefited from trust which decreases the trading costs 
on both sides. This finding is widely accepted and can explain some of the ―mystery of 
missing trade‖. Explanations of missing trade go beyond distance, or tariffs, and goes into 
the territory of social values such as lack of trust between two countries (den Butter and 
Mosch, 2003). In their research, trust is divided into two classes: formal and informal 
trust. Formal trust is represented by ―formal agreements and formal procedures‖. Legal 
institutions offer the protection for traders. Informal trust is ―based on intrinsic 
motivations‖. Societal trust and people‘s attitudes to others are some of the basic forms of 
informal institutions. Both types of trust show substantial effects on bilateral trade, and 
their combined effects can lead the positive change of bilateral trade volumes from 90% 
to 150% increase in bilateral trade volumes.  
Cultural differences also affect bilateral trade through the channel of bilateral 
trust. Analyzing data in European countries, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) 
demonstrate that trust toward partner country can be affected by cultural roots, and in 
turn change the bilateral trade with greater extent than predicted by standard gravity 
models. 
Note that the papers cited above deal with networks or trust measures across 
trading pair. In contrast, we look at intra country measures of trust and its effect on level 
of exports using the differences in level of financial development as the basis for 
identification of the effects. In essence, we capture the effect of trust by delineating one 
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of the channels through which it could be operating i.e. by improving access to credit 
under prior constraints.   
One final strand of literature that we need to refer to vis-à-vis the research in this 
paper relates to the issue of reverse causality from trade to trust. The increased openness 
of market may lead to social disintegration (Rodrik, 1997). Chan (2007) tests this claim, 
and empirically tests that openness does not reduce the level of trust in most of societies. 
He uses trade volume as proxy for openness and level of globalization, and finds that 
generalized trust actually improves by globalization. In a society with more equalized 
income, openness leads to the decline of quaint, old values and the acceptance of new, 
useful values from foreign countries, so people are more collective in such environment, 
and generalized trust should be higher. The issue of reverse causality in our case even if it 
were true is mitigated to some extent because of the disaggregated product level analysis. 
These papers generally reflect the direct relationship between trust or social 
networks, and international trade by either lowering informal trade barriers and 
transaction costs, or trust‘s straightforward effects. Focusing on the financial market 
channel for trust, it is important to first outline the relationship between financial 
constraints and international trade.  
Why do financial factors matter for international trade market? Stiebale (2011) 
provides two reasons for this: first, a developed financial system allows exporters to get 
sufficient funds that can give them a comparative advantage; secondly, trade cost limits 
firms‘ ability to participate in international market as there are more fixed costs involved 
in exporting. Melitz (2003) proposes that firms which want to enter export market face 
fixed sunk cost, and only those with productivity above the cut-off (a threshold) are able 
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to export successfully. Based on that, Manova (2008b) introduces financial constraints 
into directly Melitz‘s model, and counts the relative cost of getting credits as part of 
export costs which in turn determines firm‘s ability to enter export markets. Firms 
overcoming both financial and other sunk cost become eligible to be exporters.  
Manova, Wei and Zhang (2009) compare foreign-owned firms and joint ventures, 
and find that the former perform better in export market since they can receive financial 
support from their parent firms and experience  more flexible financial constraints than 
the latter. 
Financial constraints comprise not only capital restrictions, but also firm‘s 
financial health, in terms of indicators such as liquidity and leverage. With better 
financial health, it is easier for firms to cover the entry cost and ease their financial 
constraints. In Greenaway, Guariglia and Kneller (2007), exporters, especially continuous 
and consistent exporters, tend to display better financial health than non-exporters. Since 
firms will be screened off from export markets if they do not have adequate financial 
strength, those successfully selling products abroad possess financial advantage (Bellone, 
Musso, Nesta and Schiavo, 2010); they also find that increasing number of exporting 
destinations leads to higher sunk costs of entry and can harms firm‘s financial health. 
To summarize, the level of development of financial markets is one of the 
important determinants of trade flows. Level of financial development on the one hand 
increases economic growth as discussed above (which itself increases trade over time), 
on the other hand it lets firms raises funds at a lower cost (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).   
Manova (2008b) proposes that both financial development as well as financial 
vulnerability determine financial constraints and affect the volume of exports as well as 
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the extensive margin in terms of the number of varieties and turnover in product 
composition. Berthou (2007) finds similar effects of financial development on trade. 
With this background we test if trust can be an important factor in determining 
exports by filling in for formal sources of finance if they are lacking or are 
underdeveloped.  
Some studies consider the relationship between trust and institutions where formal 
institutions facilitate economic activities with laws or other official rules, and informal 
institutions that run on social values. It is in case of the latter that trust is more important 
since it is likely to be correlated with the development of informal institutions.  Knack 
and Keefer (1997) conclude that in areas with weaker formal institutions, trust is more 
important to economic growth. Trust reduces the coefficients of variables that proxy for 
formal institutions in Zak and Knack (2001); they explore the role of trust on investment 
as a percentage of GDP and growth rate of GDP per capita through the pathway of 
interaction between informality of the institutions (related to credit) and the consequent 
need for trust.  
 
III. Data 
The trust indicators we use are from the World Values Survey (WVS), where five 
waves have been conducted so far.  The first survey was carried out in 1981. We use the 
last three waves where the trust measures are available. In the World Values Survey, the 
third wave is from 1994 to 1998, the fourth is from 1999 to 2004, and the last one is from 
2005 to 2007. The number of countries covered in the three waves is 52, 67, and 54, 
respectively. Over 248,000 people were interviewed, and they represent nearly 88% of 
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the world‘s population as of 2007 (WVS Association). The WVS provides detailed 
information about human capital, religion, politics, economic and social lives in countries 
over time (WVS Association). 
 In the WVS, there are many related questions on people‘s attitude and 
relationship with others, and also on their social behavior. For instance, people were 
asked about how they value their relationship with their family members and friends, 
their colleagues; how they involve themselves in social activities; and how they evaluate 
the social environment around them. Furthermore, there are several questions involving  
trust. For example, people were asked how they trust their neighbors, people they 
personally know, people who they first meet, and people from other nations/religions. 
Considering the consistency of the phrasings of the questions and availability for a 
reasonably large number of countries, we choose the question about ―trust in other 
people‖, and people‘s attitude to family and friends as proxies for the two trust measures.  
The question for the first trust variable is put as follows ―Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in 
dealing with people?‖ The options for answer are as follows: ―most people can be 
trusted‖ coded as 1 or ―cannot be too careful‖ coded as 2. For estimation purposes, we 
convert the responses into a binary measure where 1 stands for ―trusted‖, and 0 
otherwise.  
With the data collected from a nationally representative sample, we consider the 
average value as the country‘s trust level which reveals the percentage of people who 
would like to trust others. Knack and Keefer (1997) distinguish ―other people‖ in this 
variable from the definition including family and friends. We could then assume that in a 
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high-trust environment, it is easier to believe in others whom one meets infrequently or 
irregularly. 
Generally it is family and friends that are closest in relationship for most people. 
Since ―trust in other people‖ excludes family and friends, it is necessary to examine the 
potential effects from this group of people separately. We choose questions which 
capture people‘s attitude towards their family and friends. In the WVS, respondents were 
asked to mark the importance of family and friends in their lives on a graded scale. The 
ptions for this question were: 1 for ―very important‖, 2 for ―rather important‖, 3 for ―not 
very important‖ and 4 for ―not important at all‖.  
We convert the categorical variable into dummy variable that equal 1 if people 
think family or friends as ―very important‖ to them. We believe that this best measures 
trust in that people seriously consider the status of their family and friends in their life, 
have tight connection with them, and treat them as trustful. We rename this variable trust 
in family and friends which is equal to 1 if people choose both family and friends are 
―very important‖ in their life, zero otherwise. Note that constructed in this way, we treat 
the effect of importance of family and friends equally. Similar to the ―trust in people‖, 
this trust variable shows the percentage of people who trust their family and friends in a 
country. 
Therefore people‘s attitude towards family and friends directly reflects how much 
they believe in them. In other words, the trust level could be assumed to be positively 
correlated with the importance put on family and friends. Note that the part of importance 
of family and friends could lie in the possibility that they can be called upon to provide 
funds when needed. 
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In our dataset for estimation, there are 35, 22 and 30 countries appearing as 
exporter in each wave. Table 2.1 summarizes the two trust variables by waves. On 
average, more than one quarter of people in exporting countries believe that others can be 
trusted. The minimum value of trust is in Brazil over the period of 1994-1999 at less than 
3%. The maximum value is from Sweden in the last wave, and nearly 68% of 
interviewees are likely to trust others. Small within group standard deviation reflects that 
people‘s evaluation on trust is relatively stable over time; in fact, within variation is less 
than one fifth of the total variation.   
For the family and friends variable, globally nearly 40% people think that their 
family members and friends are very important. The average value of importance of 
family and friends is significantly higher than the trust in other people. It is expected that 
trust/importance is higher in case of closer connections. The lowest value is from the 
third wave in Bangladesh, and the highest value is from the last wave in Georgia where 
over 78% population classifies their family and friends as very important. Again the 
values are very stable over time where the within variation is only one fourth the total 
variation. 
Trade data comes from UN Comtrade provided by the United Nations Statistics 
Division (UNSD). It contains the largest bilateral international commodity trade 
information over 140 countries and regions since 1960.  
Figure 2.1 describes the trend of exports of goods and services as a percentage of 
GDP for the whole world from 1994 to 2009, respectively. The world‘s total export 
comprises more than 20% of GDP since 1999, and up to a quarter after 2004, though 
there is a sharp drop in 2009 due to the financial crisis. Not only has volume of exports 
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risen over time but number of trading nations has also gone up. In 1994, only 99 
countries exported some goods or services, and 62 of them were developing countries; 
the number of importing countries was 226. In 2003, 166 countries exported, and 119 of 
them were developing countries. Figure 2.2 shows the change in the number of trading 
partners. As openness of developing countries has increased over time, the financial 
needs of the exporting sector are expected to have risen alongside. 
 Since financially developed countries usually have more exports and diverse 
destinations (Manova, 2008b), and both of the trust and financial variables in this 
research are at the country level, then aggregate level of exports could face problems of 
endogeneity. In our research, we use the data with the ISIC Revision3 classification using 
the export flows data at the two and three digit sector level. There are 31 types of 
products at two digit level while the three digit level includes 72 industry/sectors. For 
example, 01 is labeled as ―agriculture, hunting and related service activities‖ at the 2 digit 
level and includes 2 subcategories at the three digit level: 011-- ―growing of crops; 
market gardening; horticulture‖, and 012—―farming of animals‖. In our analysis, for a 
single observation, the trade value is the quantity of a specific type of product shipped 
from country i to country j. In total there are 51 exporting countries, and 132 importing 
countries spreading into 3 waves, and the total number of country-pairs adds up to 4750. 
The WVS was conducted by 3-5 year waves. We create the mean value of trade 
volumes for each wave. All trade values are deflated and measured in constant US dollars 
(Year 2000=100) in order to remove the inflation effects. However, since only a part of 
countries join the survey every time, the whole panel is unbalanced.  
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Following Manova, (2008a), Bertho (2007), Rajan and Zingales (1998), one of 
the proxies for financial development is the domestic credit provided by banking sector 
as a percentage of GDP coming from the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators 
(WDI). For most markets, banks are the major source of credits. Banks‘ capacity for 
providing funds to support economic activities reflects the level of development of 
country‘s financial market. 
In addition, the financial development variable is converted into dummy variables 
by the following method. First we take the average value of these variables by WVS 
wave. We calculate the median values of all countries available in the WDI database in 
each wave, and use the global median as the dividing line. We create new dummy 
variable which equals 1 if a country‘s value is less than the median. A country is labeled 
as less financial developed if its financial indicator is less than the global median value, 
otherwise it is considered financially developed.  
Table 2.2 presents the statistics of the financial development indicator in both 
continuous case and by waves. The credit variable assumes a high value in wave 3 due to 
the extremely high value in Spain.
12
 Between 1994 and 1999, based on our measurement 
of financial development, nearly half of the countries in the WVS belong to the less 
financially developed group. The share of low financial development countries decreases 
over time, which is significant since it provides us the variation to capture the interaction 
between trust and financial development.   
Table 2.3a and 2.3b present the summary statistics on trade, i.e., the average value 
of exports at ISIC 2 and 3 digit levels (revision 3), with and without China respectively. 
                                                          
12
 Spain is, therefore, dropped from the sample in our main analysis. However, the entire analysis has also 
been carried out including Spain with no qualitative change in the results. 
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According to the financial development indicator, countries are separated into two 
groups. Overall, the value of exports increases drastically from 1994 to 2007 in both 
industry classifications. Note that the average exports are much higher for financially 
developed countries (credit dummy=0). For example, in two digit classification, the 
industry average is 20.06 million USD for the developed country group, whereas it is 
9.45 million for the other group. Financially developed countries maintain a large share 
of exports in the world; however, the growth rate of exports of less financially developed 
countries is higher. 
We also set a sub-sample which excludes China in that it accounts for a great 
proportion of total global exports and still have a high degree of informality in the 
economy. Tsai (2004) mentions that in China the government limits informal finance to 
prohibit borrowers from usurious money-lending. Informal money-lending is illegal 
(according to China‘s central bank). Using firm level data, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Masksimovic (2010) find that though 80% of the sampled firms financed from 
―reputation and relationship-based‖ channels, it is not responsible for the fast growth of 
private sector in China. In wave 3, the share of China‘s exports is around 9.5%, and 
grows to 21.4% and 23.6% in wave 4 and 5, respectively. Analysis on a sample without 
China is one of our robustness checks. Table 2.4a is the description of the trust variables 
classified by categories of financial development. The average value of trust in other 
people is much higher for countries in financially developed category. For instance, 
around 30% of people trust others in countries that are over the global median value of 
credit disbursement; the corresponding number is only 20% in the converse case. Two 
groups do not have a significant difference in average value of importance of family and 
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friends in either indicator of financial development. Over 40% of people rate their family 
and friends as very important to them. When market capitalization is equal to 1 i.e. less 
financially developed, in wave 5 nearly half of total people treat their family and friends 
as very important. The average values of trust variables do not change significantly if 
China is omitted from the sample (Table 2.4b). 
Since our assumption is that as financial development level is a significant factor 
in determining exports (both propensity as well as levels), and trust can be a 
compensation for a lower level of financial development, we explore the correlation 
between the trust variables and export values by country groups. Table 2.5 presents the 
correlation of trust variables and export values for different financially developed groups. 
Except the case of trust in family and friends for financially developed countries, all 
correlations are positive so implying that trust may improve the export volumes for 
countries with lower level of financial development. Trust in other people has higher 
correlations with exports than the trust in family and friends. As comparison, in Table 2.5 
for more financially developed group though trust in other people is still positively 
correlated with exports, the value is lower than the less financially developed countries. 
Trust in family and friends even shows negative correlations. Based on the correlations 
we can assume that trust values have stronger relationship with exports, especially for 
less financial developed countries.     
Additionally, several country-pair specific variables are included in the different 
specifications. The uniqueness of country-pair could affect the quantity and possibility of 
trade. According to their nature, such country-pair variables can be divided into two 
groups, time-invariant variables such as distance, cultural background etc.; the other set 
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of variables that are time varying across different waves, such as tariff rate.  We include 
several pair varying control variables such as whether the pair of countries share 
boundary, whether both countries are landlocked, and whether both countries have coasts. 
The other set comprises cultural and economic background variables including whether 
two countries share same language, whether they ever had a colonial relationship, 
whether they share common legal origin, whether two countries had or have a war 
between them, whether both countries use common currency and whether they are 
members of GATT.  
We also want to include some additional country-pair specific variables. Among 
the time varying variables we include: business costs for both exporting and importing 
countries. Business costs are the amount of money required for firms to start their 
business in the market. It is calculated as a fixed share of annual GNI per capita so that 
the value of costs varies in each wave. The barrier for entering the market is high if the 
business costs are high. Since it would be costlier to meet requirements for entering 
exporting markets, covering the start-up costs is the basic condition for firms to begin 
their international business. We take the average value of business costs for a trading pair 
in each period.  
The effect of this variable can be ambiguous. If exporting country has high 
business costs, it is harder for firms to enter the market, and this also prevents exporting. 
If it is the importing country that has high business costs, it can stimulate exports to such 
countries. The last possible case is that both countries have similar cost requirements and 
it is hard to predict the effect of barrier from start up costs. The second time-variant 
65 
 
variable is the country-pair specific tariff rate which is from UNCTAD and WTO 
database. Each country-pair typically has a specific tariff in each wave.  
 
IV. Model  
To test our hypothesis of trust being important in face of lack of formal finance, 
we estimate the interaction effects of two key variables. The financial development 
indicator (formal credit) is a dummy variable that separates the observations into two 
categories. When it is equal to 1, it represents the lower level of financial development. 
To begin with, we follow Manova‘s (2008a) specification to estimate the effects 
of trust and financial development on aggregate exports at the industry level. Manova 
(2008a) uses the aggregate exports at four digit industry level of SITC Revision2 (and 
aggregated the data to three digit level of ISIC 3 in order to match with financial 
vulnerability) to examine the effects of equity market liberalization. In her specification, 
equity market liberalization appears as a single dependent variable as well as an 
interaction with industry level external financial dependence and asset tangibility. We 
aggregate the export values by two and three digit industry classifications, respectively. 
The other difference is that in our main specification trade is country-pair specific in our 
dataset, and Manova uses aggregate exporter values. To test the trust effects in different 
financial development categories, we use the credit dummy along with its interaction 
with the trust variables.  
We start with the Manova (2008a) type specification. The estimation equation is: 
(1) 1 2ist it it it i s t istExport FinDev Trust FinDevdummy             
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where the dependent variable is the value of exports from country i at time t in industry s. 
λi is exporter‘s fixed effects. λt denotes time fixed effects while λs is fixed effects for the 
sectors. The i.i.d. error term is εijt. Trust is represented by two variables: the percentage of 
people in exporting country i at time t who trust others, and percentage of people in 
exporting country i at time t who think their family and friends are very important. 
Fin.Dev reflecst the level of availability of formal credit in country i at time t. If it equals 
1 then the exporting country has low availability of formal finance (less than median 
credit disbursement).  
The coefficient of the interaction term reflects the differential effects of trust with 
lower levels of financial development. If it is positive then social trust has a greater effect 
on exports of countries with less financially developed economies.  
Industry dummies fixed effects λs in the equation capture different industry 
specific characteristics.  Some industries are more active in export markets compared to 
others because of several observed and unobserved factors. For instance, in both two and 
three digit classifications, the export values of mining of uranium and thorium ores are 
the minimum of all products in the world (possibly because of international regulations as 
well as their small supplies). On the other side, manufacturing of machinery and 
equipment has one of the largest export volumes. 
Further, we use a set of wave dummy variables λt as time fixed effects. Factors 
such as worldwide economic shocks are subsumed in these fixed effects. If there is any 
global economic shock attacking the world market, for instance, technology innovation, 
global economic crisis, etc., it will induce changes in every sector. These kind of changes 
at the wave level are captured by wave fixed effects. 
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Note that, having little variation over time, the trust variables are highly collinear 
with the exporter dummies and hence do not appear in the regression as a separate 
variable (only appear in the interaction term). Table 2.1 shows the standard deviation for 
overall sample as well as within groups. Within variation in trust in people (and trust in 
family and friends) is only 18.75% (26.66%) of the overall variation. This is similar to 
Manova (2008a) where external financial dependence as well as asset tangibility also 
does not vary over time. 
Except the credit dummy and i-j pair dummy variable, all dependent and 
independent variables are in logarithm.  
Apart from the analysis for the aggregate exports, we also consider the effects on 
bilateral exports. There are several reasons for analysis. First, owing to different reasons, 
the effects of trust could vary at the level of trading pairs. If lack of information inhibits 
credit flows then some markets have less knowledge about them among lenders. This 
could be because of factors like social networks as in Rauch (2001). Even if information 
were there the markets could differ in degree of risk where outcomes such as contract 
enforcement are concerned. With multinationals the access to credit for exporters could 
itself differ. If banks have branches in countries in a trading pair, exporters would have 
easier access to formal finance. 
Finally, the concern for endogeneity i.e. trade having an effect on levels of trust is 
much less if bilateral exports as opposed to aggregate exports are concerned.        
We use the following estimation equation:  
(2) 
1 2 3 4
5 6
ijst it it it i j
ij ijt i j s t ijst
Export FinDev Trust FinDevdummy GDP GDP
C D
   
      
    
      
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where, Cij  is a vector of country-pair specific variables which are constant overtime and 
Dijt  is a vector of time-variant country-pair specific variables. In the case, GDP for both 
exporter and importer are included. As time-variant variables, the economic size of trade 
partners is basic component in the gravity model. Since trust and financial development 
variables in the model are exporter specific and trade is bilateral, GDP in i and j can 
capture the country‘s variance over time. Additionally, we add exporting country and 
importing country dummy variables as fixed country effects, λi and λj, respectively.  
As a vector of time-variant variables for country pair i and j, Dijt contains two 
variables. Total tariff rate and average business start-up costs belong to this vector. This 
vector reflects the trading costs in bilateral trades over time.  
The set of country-pair specific variables also include weighted bilateral distance, 
cultural background variables and other geopolitical characteristics. All country-pair 
variables are listed in vector Cij.  
 
V. Results 
Main Results 
Table 2.6a presents the results of specification (1) of industry-aggregate exports 
(both two and three digits). We do not find significance of the interaction term. The 
aggregated exports do not provide the variation to estimate the effect of trust and 
financial development on exports.  
Table 2.6b presents the results of specification (2) of bilateral trade in two digit 
classification with and without China. Table 2.6c presents the same regressions in three 
digit classifications.  
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In the full sample (with China, that is), the financial development variable 
exhibits significantly positive coefficients in both two and three digit classifications 
except one regression. The amount of exports will increase if banks or other formal 
financial institutions are capable to providing funds to meet the demands of the exporting 
firms. As Manova (2008b) argues, firms confront more restricted credit constraints 
because they must cover costlier spending before starting a business in the export market. 
Next we want to check whether higher level of trust in other people affect exports 
in countries with lower financial development level. The coefficients of trust interacted 
with private credit issued by banks are significantly positive in all specifications. An 
additional 10% of a country‘s population trusting other people would raise exports by 
0.95% in two digit industries, and 0.88% in three digit industries.  
In a community with greater levels of trust in family and friends it may be easier 
to find informal sources of finance. However, there is not any positive siginicance shown 
in either two or three digit classifications. 
All country-pair specific variables affect export volumes significantly as well. It is 
easy to interpret the positive signs of contiguity, language, common legal origin, and 
colonial relationship. For any pair of countries sharing connected border, it is more 
convenient for firms and individuals to do the business across the border, and shipping 
costs can be reduced as well as transaction time. With the same language and common 
legal origin, people share similar background and the communication barrier will 
decrease.  A pair of countries can build up stronger economic connection if they ever had 
a colonial tie.  
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Although common currency is expected to accelerate exports, it does not show the 
desired effects. Exports lower between country pairs if there are conflicts between them, 
greater bilateral distance between them, and a higher level of tariff rate between them. If 
both the trading partners are GATT members then trade increase (GATT‘s basic goal is 
to integrate the global market and help promote international trade). Landlocked and 
coasts are two geographic variables which describe both countries natural characteristics. 
Exporting activity requires convenient and less expensive method to ship products abroad, 
and ocean shipping is still the main method to transport products. Exports between two 
countries with coasts are greater than the trading pair that is landlocked. The effects of 
business costs are ambiguous to interpret. The increase of exporter‘s or importer‘s GDP 
will contribute to the exports as well.  
Overall, the estimation results support our hypothesis that high level of trust can 
help increase export volumes. Insufficient credits from formal institutions lower exports. 
Trust in other people can compensates for a lack of available formal credit.  
 
Robustness Check 
We remove China from the previous dataset to do the robustness check. Berggren,  
Elinder, and Jordahl (2008) use a similar approach and find that the trust effects are 
smaller without China. In our sample, China‘s total export volumes have taken up to 
9.44%, 21.20% and 23.74% of the total sample value in three waves, respectively, and its 
export destinations cover all importing countries in the dataset. Therefore China has 
significant impact on the world‘s export business. To exclude China from the original 
dataset, we can reduce the weight of a single reporter and check if the trust effects still 
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exist in the rest of countries. The trust effects in the sample without China is larger than 
the previous one  
The last two columns of Table 2.6a and 2.6b are the regressions using two 
specifications of trust in two and three digit industry classifications. The significance of 
formal credits disappears in only one estimation when China is excluded. However, the 
interactive terms are still significantly positive and have even larger coefficients 
compared with the full sample‘s results. Though people in China have high trust level in 
their families (nearly 72%), they do not give much credit to friends. Only 26% of the 
population takes the relationship with friends seriously. The low values in trust in friends 
cut down the value of trust in family and friends. 23% of the population is positive to 
their family and friends compared with the sample average at 42%. Meanwhile, in China 
the government does not encourage the informal credits (Tsai, 2004). The full dataset 
with China represses the effects of trust in family and friends. Excluding China increases 
the significance of it drastically. When countries are in the category of lower financial 
development, the marginal effects of trust in family and friends are up to 1.11% and 0.84% 
in two and three digit bilateral trade respectively with respect to 10% increase of trust 
value. The trust in other people also raises the corresponding effects which are 1.32% 
and1.25%. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
Previous studies have provided evidence of how trust has important effects on 
economic performance. In this paper we explore whether trust could have an effect on a 
country‘s export performance. The particular channel that we identify is the access to 
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informal credits, the benefit of which would be magnified if formal sources are 
inadequate. 
We combine the trust data, financial development data, and country-pair export 
values in two digit and three digit product classifications over a fourteen year period. 
Variation in aggregate exports is not capable of identifying the effect of trust which has 
little time variation. We, therefore, exploit the variation in bilateral trade to identify the 
effect of trust which does not have sufficient time variation. We use an extensive set of 
country-pair specific factors. The fixed effects from exporting and importing countries, 
industry, and time are also included in our analysis. Two types of trust are chosen from 
the WVS: trust in other people, trust in family and friends. Credits issued by banks as 
percentage of GDP is used as the measure of availability of formal credit. Our empirical 
specification is rich in extensively accounting for observed and unobserved factors that 
could bias the coefficients of interest.   
In bilateral trade, for financially repressed economies, trust has a significant effect 
on exports.  The amount of credit issued directly determines the level of bilateral trades in 
dataset with China (the full sample). A great deal of formal credits allows firms to access 
sufficient working capital to cover the cost to enter the international market. The 
interactive specification combined with disaggregated level of analyses minimizes the 
potential biases in the results. Our results also provide evidence that exporters in 
countries failing to provide sufficient formal credit can rely on informal credit 
represented by trust.  
We believe that trust among people is a new channel for borrowers to collect 
external credits. This informal channel of financial resources is what can supplement for 
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less developed formal financial institutions. Trust in family and friends shows significant 
positive effects when China is removed. 
Given the unique situation of China with dualistic economy and very high level of 
exports, we also check for robustness of our findings by dropping China from our sample. 
The results are preserved qualitatively. 
The empirical results could provide some new ideas for policy makers. Naturally, 
policies targeted to improve social values may be a bit of a stretch. However, countries 
abundant in social values such as trust but a lack of financial development can try to 
exploit their social values; they can, for instance, make sure that the informal credit 
market is smoothly functioning, which might improve their exports and subsequently 
economic development. These governments can also encourage firms to seek informal 
capital resources and remove the obstacles that may discourage them to do so. 
Furthermore, for more pointed policy designs, it would be desirable to investigate the 
characteristics of different types of product, and identify the kind of social values that 
would be most effective.  
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Table2.1.Statistics of Trust Variables by Wave 
 Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Within 
group 
Std.Dev. Min Max 
Other people       
Wave 3 35 0.27 0.15 - 0.03 0.65 
Wave 4 22 0.28 0.17 - 0.08 0.66 
Wave 5 30 0.26 0.17 - 0.04 0.68 
Total 84 0.27 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.68 
Family and friends       
Wave 3 35 0.38 0.15 - 0.16 0.70 
Wave 4 22 0.43 0.16 - 0.18 0.72 
Wave 5 30 0.46 0.14 - 0.20 0.78 
Total 87 0.42 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.78 
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Table 2.2 Statistics of Formal Credit 
 
 Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
No. of less 
financially 
developed 
No. of 
financially 
developed 
Credit      
Wave 3 35 77.69 81.79 - - 
Wave 4 22 88.23 86.41 - - 
Wave 5 30 95.01 81.87 - - 
Total 87 86.44 82.41 - - 
Credit Dummy      
Wave 3 35 0.51 0.51 18 18 
Wave 4 22 0.18 0.39 4 18 
Wave 5 30 0.37 0.49 11 19 
Total 87 0.38 0.49 - - 
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Table 2.3a Mean of Exports by Categories of Financial Variables 
Wave 3 4 5 Total 
2dgt product     
Credit=0 18.85 16.04 25.37 20.27 
Credit=1 6.39 4.34 14.04 9.45 
3dgt product     
Credit=0 9.28 8.20 12.68 10.12 
Credit=1 3.61 2.70 7.66 5.31 
Note: Country-pair exports are in million constant US$ (Year 2000=100). 
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Table 2.3b Mean of Exports by Categories of Financial Variables without China 
Wave 3 4 5 Total 
2dgt product     
Credit dummy=0 17.37 13.64 19.56 16.87 
Credit dummy=1 6.39 4.34 14.04 9.45 
3dgt product     
Credit dummy=0 8.90 7.06 9.87 8.62 
Credit dummy=1 3.61 2.70 7.66 5.31 
Note: Country-pair exports are in million constant US$ (Year 2000=100). 
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Table 2.4a Statistics of Trust Variables by Credit Categories 
 Other People  Family and Friends 
Wave 3 4 5 Total  3 4 5 Total 
Credit=0          
Obs 17 18 19 54  17 18 19 54 
Mean 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.32  0.42 0.43 0.46 0.44 
Std. Dev. 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18  0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Max 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.68  0.64 0.72 0.67 0.72 
Min 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03  0.19 0.18 0.23 0.18 
Credit=1          
Obs 18 4 11 33  18 4 11 33 
Mean 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19  0.35 0.42 0.45 0.39 
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.09  0.16 0.27 0.15 0.17 
Max 0.38 0.31 0.43 0.43  0.70 0.68 0.78 0.78 
Min 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04  0.16 0.18 0.20 0.16 
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Table 2.4b Statistics of Trust Variables by Credit Categories without China 
 Other People  Family and Friends 
Wave 3 4 5 Total  3 4 5 Total 
Credit=0          
Obs 16 17 18 51  16 17 18 51 
Mean 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.30  0.43 0.45 0.48 0.45 
Std. Dev. 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17  0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 
Min 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.68  0.64 0.72 0.67 0.72 
Max 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03  0.19 0.29 0.23 0.19 
Credit=1          
Obs 18 4 11 33  18 4 11 33 
Mean 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19  0.35 0.42 0.45 0.39 
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.09  0.16 0.27 0.15 0.17 
Min 0.38 0.31 0.43 0.43  0.70 0.68 0.78 0.78 
Max 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04  0.16 0.18 0.20 0.16 
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Table 2.5 Correlation of Export and Trust Variables by Financial Development Category 
 Other People Family and Friends 
2dgt product   
Credit 
Dummy=0 0.035 -0.035 
Credit 
Dummy=1 0.044 0.014 
3dgt product   
Credit 
Dummy=0 0.027 -0.030 
Credit 
Dummy=1 0.032 0.010 
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Table 2.6a Estimation using Total Exports  
 Total Exports 
 VARIABLES 2dgt 3dgt 
Credit -0.271 -0.147 -0.0635 -0.0112 
 (0.400) (0.406) (0.267) (0.271) 
Creditdummy*trust_ppl 0.144  0.0943  
 (0.127)  (0.0837)  
Creditdummy*trust_ff  0.112  0.104 
  (0.224)  (0.149) 
Exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wave fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2,565 2,565 5,896 5,896 
R-squared 0.972 0.972 0.965 0.965 
RMSE 1.922 1.925 1.943 1.943 
Standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6b Estimation in Two Digit Bilateral Exports 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Exports 
 With China Without China 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit 0.251*** 0.470*** 0.111 0.252*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0775) (0.0818) (0.0870) 
Creditdummy*trust_ppl 0.0947***  0.132***  
 (0.0219)  (0.0233)  
Creditdummy*trust_ff  -0.0555  0.111** 
  (0.0438)  (0.0518) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.748*** 1.835*** 0.859*** 0.838*** 
 (0.105) (0.111) (0.151) (0.178) 
Importer‘s GDP 0.772*** 0.782*** 0.814*** 0.813*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0807) (0.0847) (0.0847) 
Contiguity 0.518*** 0.519*** 0.859*** 0.838*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0434) (0.0434) 
Language 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.285*** 0.283*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
Colonizer post 1945 0.895*** 0.903*** 0.750*** 0.750*** 
 (0.165) (0.165) (0.167) (0.167) 
War -0.984*** -0.980*** -0.927*** -0.916*** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.179) (0.179) 
Colonial relationship 1.124*** 1.124*** 1.063*** 1.062*** 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) 
Common legal origin 0.480*** 0.481*** 0.503*** 0.505*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Common currency -0.565** -0.573** -1.031*** -1.034*** 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.232) (0.232) 
GATT 0.432*** 0.411*** 0.488*** 0.493*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0384) (0.0432) (0.0432) 
Landlocked -0.0687 -0.0693 -0.0948 -0.0981 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) (0.188) 
Coasts 0.381** 0.382** 0.363** 0.365** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.176) (0.176) 
Bus.costs 0.0735*** 0.0764*** 0.0284 0.0360 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0246) (0.0247) 
Bilateral distance -1.641*** -1.642*** -1.637*** -1.637*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
Trariff -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.00706) (0.00706) (0.00715) (0.00716) 
Exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wave fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 132,715 132,715 125,028 125,028 
R-squared 0.841 0.841 0.832 0.832 
RMSE 2.482 2.482 2.498 2.499 
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Table 2.6c Estimation in Three Digit Bilateral Exports 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 VARIABLES 
Exports 
With China Without China 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit 0.259*** 0.497*** 0.106* 0.267*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0564) (0.0602) (0.0640) 
Creditdummy*trust_ppl 0.0881***  0.125***  
 (0.0157)  (0.0167)  
Creditdummy*trust_ff  -0.0904***  0.0856** 
  (0.0320)  (0.0381) 
Exporter‘s GDP 1.891*** 1.998*** 0.853*** 0.880*** 
 (0.0743) (0.0781) (0.109) (0.130) 
Importer‘s GDP 0.543*** 0.550*** 0.570*** 0.569*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0347) (0.0347) 
Contiguity 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.554*** 0.556*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0297) (0.0297) 
Language 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.251*** 0.250*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0187) 
Colonizer post 1945 1.000*** 1.010*** 0.830*** 0.831*** 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) 
War -0.915*** -0.911*** -0.854*** -0.844*** 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.121) (0.121) 
Colonial relationship 1.022*** 1.021*** 0.988*** 0.986*** 
 (0.0885) (0.0885) (0.0893) (0.0893) 
Common legal origin 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.493*** 0.495*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
Common currency -0.238 -0.245 -0.603*** -0.607*** 
 (0.158) (0.158) (0.161) (0.161) 
GATT 0.408*** 0.384*** 0.463*** 0.469*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0312) (0.0312) 
Landlocked -0.769*** -0.769*** -0.763*** -0.766*** 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
Coasts 0.906*** 0.906*** 0.843*** 0.845*** 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139) 
Bus.costs 0.0316* 0.0345** -0.0208 -0.0134 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0181) (0.0181) 
Bilateral distance -1.494*** -1.494*** -1.486*** -1.486*** 
 (0.00888) (0.00888) (0.00914) (0.00914) 
Trariff -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
 (0.00531) (0.00531) (0.00538) (0.00538) 
Exporter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wave fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 259,674 259,674 242,543 242,543 
R-squared 0.803 0.803 0.792 0.792 
RMSE 2.505 2.505 2.517 2.517 
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Figure 2.1 World‘s Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP), From UN COMTRADE 
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Figure 2.2 The Number of Trade Partners in International Trade, From UN COMTRADE 
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Appendix 
Table A2.1 Country list by wave  
Wave 
3 4 5 
Azerbaijan Argentina Argentina 
Argentina Bangladesh Australia 
Australia Canada Brazil 
Bangladesh Chile Bulgaria 
Brazil China Canada 
Bulgaria India Chile 
Chile Indonesia China 
China Japan Cyprus 
Colombia Jordan Georgia 
Croatia Mexico Ghana 
Czech Republic Morocco India 
Dominican Republic Nigeria Indonesia 
El Salvador Pakistan Japan 
Estonia Peru Jordan 
Finland Philippines Malaysia 
Germany Saudi Arabia Mexico 
Hungary Singapore Morocco 
India South Africa New Zealand 
Japan Sweden  Peru 
Latvia Turkey  Poland 
Lithuania Uganda  Russian Federation 
Mexico Zimbabwe South Africa 
New Zealand  Sweden 
Nigeria  Switzerland 
Norway  Thailand 
Peru  Trinidad and Tobago 
Philippines  Turkey 
Poland  Ukraine 
Russian Federation  Uruguay 
South Africa  Zambia 
Spain   
Sweden   
Switzerland   
Turkey   
Ukraine   
Uruguay   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
FINANCIAL REFORMS AND EXPORTS: 
AN INVESTIGATION WITH MULTIPLE REFORM MEASURES  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we use a new database about financial reforms from Abiad et al. (2010) to 
evaluate how the level of financial liberalization affects exports. In our specification we 
follow Manova (2008a) and examine the impact of the summary measure of financial 
reform (a normalized reform score), and seven individual reform measures. High level of 
liberalization directly increases exports; shifts exports up if it works as providing new 
channels for credit, but shifts exports down if it represses the accessibility of external 
capital. We also find that the liberalization effects are stronger in sectors with higher 
external financial dependence, or smaller shares of tangible assets. The results are robust 
in a sample without China.
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I. Introduction 
There exists an extensive literature investigating the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) use six financial 
indicators and find strong positive connection between financial development and GDP 
per capita in developing countries. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) find that equity 
market liberalization could raise real economic growth rate by 1.2%. Levine, Loayza and 
Beck (2000) not only demonstrate such positive link, but also find that financial 
development can be promoted by legal reforms that eventually stimulate economic 
growth. In this paper, we want to examine if financial development could exhibit similar 
impact on exports as it does on GDP growth. Note that growth in trade itself contributes 
towards GDP growth.  
The endowment of factors, such as labor or working capital is important in 
determining trade flows. Manova (2008b) proposes the idea that exporting firms are 
restricted by initial entry costs which are supposed to be higher than that to enter the 
domestic market. Whether firms can access sufficient external financial support is a 
crucial factor that determines the extensive (the number of firms) and intensive (quantity 
of each commodity) margins of exports. Apart from firm‘s characteristics, country‘s 
financial development also accounts for the accessibility and quantity of external capital 
(Levine 2004).  
Beck (2002) theoretically and empirically concludes that high level of financial 
development is also part of a comparative advantage for a country, and manufacturing 
exports as a share of total GDP increases as financial development rises. Chang, Hung 
and Lu (2005) confirm Beck‘s model that the share of exports in GDP is higher in 
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countries with an advanced financial system. Hur, Raj and Riyanto (2006) find similar 
results. 
There are many measures of financial development that have been used in studies 
analyzing the relationship between financial development and trade. The domestic credits 
issued by banks as a percentage of GDP from the World Development Indicator is widely 
used as a proxy for the financial development level. For instance, Manova (2008b), 
Berthou (2007), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Chang, Hung and Lu (2005), Hur, Raj and 
Riyanto (2006), Beck (2002), all use this indicator as a measure of financial development.  
Aside from measures to enhance availability of formal private credits, financial 
liberalization could be an alternative measure determining access to capital. Manova 
(2008a) and Bekaert, et al. (2005) uses equity market liberalization as the policy measure 
that affects access to capital and thereby has an effect on exports (Manova, 2008a). In 
these papers four proxies are employed: official and first-sign market liberalization 
indicator and their intensity indicator respectively, to capture the liberalization of equity 
market.  
Other measures such as openness of capital account can also represent financial 
liberalization (Bekaert et al. ,2005; Klein and Olivei, 2008).  
There are several studies associating financial liberalization with economic 
growth (Bekaert et al., 2005; Gimra, 2009; Klein and Olivei, 2008; Ranciere, Tornell and 
Westermann, 2006). Excluding Manova (2008a), there do not exist in many studies 
linking financial liberalization and international trade. As discussed above Manova 
(2008a) focuses on effect of equity market liberalization to industry level exports. She 
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concludes that with a liberalized equity market, firms can acquire capital at lower costs, 
increase investment and make capital allocation more efficient. In addition, she associates 
equity market liberalization with financial dependency and share of tangible assets in 
different sectors finding that financial liberalization has greater marginal effect on 
exports in sectors with a higher level of financial dependence, and a lower level of 
tangible assets. The results are explained as follows: considering the impact of financial 
on firms in the sectors with greater dependence on external capital; such firms would 
have a better chance to borrow capital in a liberalized market. In case of tangible assets, 
usually defined as real estate, plants and machines, they are used as collateral; firms with 
greater shares of tangible assets can borrow more easily. Hence, for sectors with more 
tangible assets, the potential effects of liberalization are likely to be smaller.  
In this paper, we examine the findings in Manova (2008a) and Hur, Raj and 
Riyanto (2006) with a substantially broader concept of financial liberalization. Equity 
market liberalization covers only one part of the capital market and is thereby not 
sufficient to fully reflect the overall effect of financial liberalization. With this broader set 
of financial liberalization measures, we want to study how liberalization affects exports 
through different channels, specifically financial policies, and capture the additional 
impact in sectors with different levels of financial vulnerability. Therefore, we choose the 
extensive set of financial reforms indicators in Abiad et al. (2010) and examine their 
effect at the sector level international trade.  
The financial reforms database developed by Abiad et al. (2010) includes seven 
measures for a country‘s financial reforms related to credit controls and excessively high 
reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking 
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sector, capital account restrictions, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking 
sector, and securities market policies. Note that although different from the source in 
Manova (2008a), the measures also include aspects of equity market reforms. In Abiad et 
al. (2010), the equity market reforms are reflected in indicators related to securities 
markets policies. The overall financial reforms is the summation of seven dimensions‘ 
scores standardized to describe the level of country‘s overall reform status. Compared 
with other financial reform databases, Abiad et al. (2010) dataset has several advantages. 
First, it covers a wide range of countries and years – 91 countries from 1973 to 2005 –
whereas Williamson and Mahar (1998) has 34 countries ranging from 1973 to 1996; 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) construct a dataset with 28 countries from 1973 to 
1999.  
Secondly, Abiad et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive dataset in terms of several 
indicators. It evaluates the reform from seven dimensions of financial policies. By 
contrast, Williamson and Mahar (1998) define six variables which mainly analyze the 
capital flows. Finally, each reform indicator in this database has a graded score which is 
better to measure the financial liberalization level. In Laeven (2003), reforms are 
measured as a binary variable and thereby cannot capture the intensity of reforms.  
With the different indicators of reforms we can analyze the effects from specific 
facets of financial reforms/policies that have an effect on exports. A priori of the effect of 
financial reforms need not be unambiguously positive on exports. Consider for example, 
deregulation of interest rate controls or priority sector lending for export sectors, reforms 
in this case could hurt rather than promote exports. Similarly, countries with low rates of 
savings could help their export sector through liberalization of international capital 
96 
 
inflows. Such cross-measure differences can be assessed with this new dataset which has 
not been feasible for the earlier papers.  
We thus extend Manova (2008a) to a much broader set of financial reforms and 
also cover a longer period of time. We implement two sets of regressions: the global 
sample and a sub-sample without China. Due to the volume and coverage of export 
commodities, China is clearly an extraordinary exporter. Also, China has special 
regulations on the mechanism and liberalization of financial market. 
We estimate the effect of financial reforms on exports both in terms of the overall 
index of reforms as well as individual reform indicators. As in earlier papers, we interact 
the reform measures with financial dependency and tangible assets in terms of 
reconstructed dummy variables. We find that there is a strong positive link between 
financial reforms and exports at the industry level. Thus, what has been shown for some 
aspects of reform tends to hold in terms of overall reforms.  
In case of individual indicators there is a significant departure from the earlier 
results where not all reforms are found to unequivocally increase exports. The difference 
comes precisely in terms of measures that have not been considered earlier. Individual 
indicators like credit controls, interest rates and banking supervision actually show 
negative effects, because the liberalization in these fields may eliminate some benefits 
from government interventions in the form of soft or priority sector lending. A developed 
and open equity market improves allocation of external capital; free capital flows 
enhance liquidity and quantity of foreign capital; both of these have significantly positive 
effects on exports. The finding that the effect of reform varies by sectors depending on 
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their external capital dependency and asset tangibility corroborates the findings in 
Manova (2008a) though with the qualification that not all reforms are export enhancing. 
The paper is structured as follows: section II presents the data and descriptive statistics of 
key variables that are later used in the regression analysis; section III presents the 
estimation strategy; section IV provides the findings; the last section concludes. 
 
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The dependent variable in the analysis is exports in industrial sectors by country 
and year. Exports data is collected from three digit level of ISIC Revision2 from UN 
Comtrade. Trade values have been deflated using United States CPI with the base year 
2000.  
As discussed above Abiad et al. (2010) construct a new database of financial 
reforms which records precisely country‘s financial liberalization levels from seven 
dimensions to evaluate the financial system. This dataset covers 91 countries ranging 
from 1973 to 2005. The seven dimensions are described as follows: 
 Credit controls and excessively high reserve requirement: Credit control includes two 
parts: the credit ceiling that restricts the maximum of lending to a specific sector; 
minimum credits to certain sector, and/or with subsidized interest rate. Central banks 
also impose high reserve requirements to commercial banks in order to adjust capital in 
markets.  
 Interest rate controls: governments may restrict both lending and deposit rate by setting 
interest rate ceiling or floor instead of market rates. 
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 Entry barriers: governments may limit foreign financial institutions to enter domestic 
financial markets by restricting their activities, having strict licensing requirements, etc. 
New domestic banks may encounter similar barriers as well.  
 State ownership in the banking sector: Represented as the proportion of banks that are 
state owned, and/or the percentage of public bank assets. Government can directly 
control capital in markets if it possesses a great share of banks‘ ownership. 
 Capital account restrictions: by controlling exchange rates, capital inflows, and capital 
outflows government could restrict international capital transaction.  
 Prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector: A series of standard is 
applied to score the effective of country‘s banking supervision.  
 Securities market policy: if government encourages the securities markets‘ 
development, and increases the openness to foreigners, then the country is considered 
liberalized. 
The score for each measurement is computed based on related survey questions, 
and the final score is adjusted into four categories: fully repressed=0, repressed=1, 
largely liberalized=2 and fully liberalized=3. For the first five measurements, if the 
country indeed applies relevant policies in the corresponding field, then it is assigned a 
status of ―fully repressed or repressed‖ in that such policies prevent external capital from 
free transaction and allocation. For instance, if central bank raises the reserve 
requirements, banks have to deposit more capital into central bank and lend out less than 
before. Banking supervision and securities markets policy encourage the development of 
financial markets by regulating markets to be efficient and attracting new investors, 
especially foreigners who bring in external capital.  
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Overall financial reform is the summation of seven scores, and its value lies in the 
interval 0 to 21. It is normalized and the value is from 0 (fully repressed) to 1(fully 
liberalized). For convenience, we also convert the individual indicators into binary 
variables which equal 1 if the corresponding indicator is labeled as ―fully liberalized‖ or 
―liberalized‖, 0 otherwise. We can consider a country is liberalized if its reform dummy 
is equal to 1.  
Following earlier literature we choose the external financial dependence and asset 
tangibility at the industry level. The data is obtained from Braun (2003). The former is 
the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations to capital expenditures 
and the latter is the share of net property, plant and equipment in total book-value assets. 
The value is based on the median firm in each sector in the U.S. The data has been 
compiled based on Compustat for different years. 
In our sample, there are 84 countries between 1973 and 2005 in 28 industry/ 
sectors. Table 3.1 provides some descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables used in the regressions below. Exports and GDP of exporting countries are 
presented in logarithms (GDP in constant 2000 USD). Individual reform indicators are 
binary variables. The statistics present the percentage of liberalized countries in terms of 
specific reform measure overtime. Overall, the interest rate controls are the least common 
with 70% of country-year observations not having them. In contrast, banking supervision 
has the highest coverage.  
Table 3.2 presents the correlations between exports and individual financial 
reform variables. Financial reform score and each reform indicators are positively 
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correlated with industry-level exports to varying degrees. The openness of securities 
market has the highest positive correlation with trade. We can interpret this as: in an open 
and active securities market, on the one hand borrowers can easily receive external 
financial support by issuing securities, and on the other hand, lenders would like to invest 
in the securities markets that are more open. Foreign investment can also enter the market 
and enhance external capital. Entry barriers for banks have the minimum correlation with 
exports.  
Table 3.3a presents the mean value of exports in different reform categories by 
different reform indicators. For countries with liberalized financial indicator, the average 
exports are significantly higher. The widest gap between two groups is in the case of 
openness of the securities market. Here, the values of exports on average are up to 8.6 
times the non-liberalized group. The number of observations in general is higher for the 
reform groups except in case of banking supervision. 
We have argued that China is an exceptional exporter which takes up a large 
portion of international trade and is active in all sectors. China‘s exports cover all 28 
sectors and the values are available from 1985 to 2005. Table 3.3b describes the exports 
in different reform categories for China. In case of entry barriers, state ownership of 
banks, and capital account, over the years China is generally classified as not liberalized. 
Restrictions on interest rate and openness of securities market do not qualify as 
liberalized until 2004. The financial reform score is as low as 0.22 compared with the 
sample mean which is 0.58. Yet, in spite of a flourishing export market, the financial 
market in China has largely been based repressed on the broad set of indicators. That 
motivated us to look at the results without China in the sample. 
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III. Model 
 We augment the specification in Manova (2008a) for a multiple set of indicators 
of financial reform and also extend it to a longer period of time. The generalized 
difference-in-difference approach in Manova (2008a) involves interacting equity market 
openness with two financial variables viz. external financial dependence and tangible 
assets. In this paper, equity market openness is supplemented with an extensive set of 
financial reform indicators with an aim to discern the effect of the individual components 
of financial reform separately.  
The export values are at the country and time level; the financial variables are 
sectoral while the financial reform variables are also at country time level. The 
interaction variables capture both sector and country level variation over time. Financial 
reforms take two forms in our specification: one is in its original value to directly reflect 
how the active reform policies improve trade; the second is in terms of a binary variable 
that equals 1 if a single reform measure is recorded as ―liberalized‖. The latter includes 
seven reform indicators and each of them not only shows individual effects but also is 
interacted with external financial dependence and asset tangibility to examine the 
differential effects based on financial vulnerability. The specification that we implement 
is given as: 
(1) 
0 1 0 1
2 3
. . _
. _ . . _
cit ct ct ct
ct i ct i
c i t cit
Exports GDP Fin reform Fin reform dum
Fin reform dum Fin dep Fin reform dum Tang
   
 
   
    
  
   
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Exports is the value in country c in sector i and in year t. Exporter‘s annual GDP 
is deflated (base year=2000) and controls for the effect from the economic size. We 
expect the sign of the first interaction term to be positive in that a liberalized financial 
system is more capable of efficient allocation of capital. For industries with high 
dependence on external capital, they are likely to be benefited more from a financial 
market with fewer restrictions on capital allocation and lending. The second interaction 
variable is expected to be negative because of the characteristics of tangible assets. 
Usually tangible assets are classified as fixed assets, for example, building, equipments, 
etc., and can work as collateral when firms borrow capital from external resources. High 
asset tangibility reduces the firm‘s dependence on the development of financial market 
while borrowing. Industries with a large share of tangible assets are thus expected to 
benefit less from a liberalized market compared to those with small share.  
The specification controls for several unobserved factors with exporter, industry 
and time fixed effects denoted ηc, ηi, ηt respectively.  
 
IV. Results 
  Estimation results are presented in Table 3.4a. There are seven columns each 
presents the regression of an individual financial reform measure.  
 First, overall financial reform score significantly contributes to exports. The score 
of financial reforms reflects the liberalization level of country‘s entire financial market. 
Countries with high score possess relatively liberalized and developed financial market 
and in these countries export firms have an advantage in receiving external finance.  
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 Different from financial reform score, binary reform variables evaluate a specific 
financial policy towards liberalization (=1), or repression (=0). We will explain below 
each indicator‘s performance in detail. 
 Credit controls, interest rate, and banking supervision decrease exports when they 
are graded as ―liberalized‖. Credit controls comprises four components: direct credits, 
subsidized interest rate, reserve requirement and credit ceilings. The first two address the 
fact that some sectors have priority in accessing external capital through government 
policy by having targeted credits, and/or subsidized interest rates. Exporting sector is one 
of such sectors, and targeted credits and special rates are parts of export subsidy methods 
(Kelly, 2009). For example, agriculture products (including agro processing) are often 
subsidized by governments for exports (Anania, 1992; Paarlberg, 1995; Girma, Gorg and 
Wagner, 2009). Many studies find a positive link between export subsidies and trade 
volumes (Zia, 2008; Girma et al., 2009). Besides, subsidy-related questions weigh at least 
50% in coding credit control‘s score so that it is reasonable to assume that this reform 
measure emphasizes official credit disbursement. Since the liberalization in credit 
controls actually reduces the quantity and possibility for export firms to receive favorable 
financial support, we believe that could explain the negative effect. 
 For the effect of restriction on interest rate, we can explain it from two sides: if 
interest rate is controlled by the central bank, commercial lenders lose the ability to adjust 
according to the demand-supply balance in the markets; on the other hand, it prevents 
rates from increasing too fast or get too high. Export firms can benefit from the second 
effect, by which they could borrow external capital with less interest rate risks.  
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 Similarly, banking supervision possibly has different effects on markets. A well 
regulated and supervised financial system helps establish a healthy capital and credit 
market. At the same time it can restrict innovations in financial sector which can increase 
the efficiency of capital allocation. As an industry with more external capital support 
(Manova, 2008b), less restrictions allow firms to get credits with fewer constrains.  
 Entry barriers and state-owned banks do not directly affect the distribution of 
external capital, so liberalization in these two policies show little impact on exports.  
 Liberalization in country‘s capital account and securities markets show strong 
effects on exports. Butkiewiez and Yanikkaya (2008) find positive connection between 
liberalization in capital account and economic growth; and FDI is also positively affected 
by capital account liberalization. Additionally, an open capital account allows freer 
inflow and outflow of capital, and in turn it could prop international trade from this 
channel as well. From the coding on securities markets, it is considered liberalized if 
government promotes the development of securities markets, and/or foreigners are 
permitted to invest in equity market. The liberalized indicators all attempt to capture 
introduction of new capital into markets. The effect from liberalized securities market is 
in fact greater than other reforms that have a positive effect. 
 When checking the effects of reforms in sectors with different levels of financial 
vulnerability, we find across all reform measures, financial liberalization effects are 
always stronger in industries with high external financial dependence. For sector with 
lower shares of tangible assets, again form is more beneficial; the effects are, however, 
less strong compared to those in of external financial dependence. The empirical results 
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confirm our assumption in previous section. For example, with an open securities markets, 
a 10% increase in sector‘s financial dependence leads to 10.66% increase in exports. 
 We also estimate a smaller sample excluding China, and get similar results as the 
full sample (Table 3.4b).  
 
V. Conclusion 
 There have been several studies that explore the link between financial 
development and international trade where most of them use private credits as proxy for 
development (Manova, 2008b; Berthou 2007; Chang, Hung and Lu, 2005; Hur, Raj and 
Riyanto, 2006; Beck, 2002). Manova (2008a) explores a new measure by using equity 
market liberalization to capture its effects on industry-level exports. However, in this 
paper we take the view that financial reforms beyond equity market liberalization could 
also play a role in determining exports of a country.  
 In our research, we employ a comprehensive database of financial reforms as 
measures of financial liberalization based on Abiad et al. (2010). There are seven reform 
measures, and the summation of them depicts country‘s overall financial liberalization 
level. We extend the specification in Manova (2008a), and find new empirical evidence 
to support the link between liberalization and exports.  
 By applying difference-in-difference approach, we find that in general exports 
increase with financial reforms. Yet, in terms of specific reforms the effects are diverse. 
Credit controls, restrictions on interest rate, and banking supervision actually decrease 
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exports if they are liberalized. Preferential lending is one conjecture that we offer in 
explaining this effect. Openness of capital account and securities markets introduce new 
capital into the market as well as increase trade opportunities. Exports are benefited from 
the liberalization in these two measures. Interacting with financial vulnerability variables, 
liberalized indicators have greater effect on exports in sectors with high financial 
dependence and those with fewer tangible assets. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Label  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Trade       
Export Deflated Annual Exports  47772 11.10 3.42 -6.85 19.14 
GDP Deflated Annual GDP  47772 8.36 1.51 4.81 11.09 
Industry Financial Structure 
Fin.Dep.  840 0.24 0.32 -0.45 1.14 
Tangibility  840 0.30 0.14 0.07 0.67 
Financial Reforms  
Fin.Reform index Financial Reform Indices  1748 0.58 0.29 0 1 
Binary measures of individual financial reform  
Credit Controls  1748 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Interest Rate  1748 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Entry Barriers  1748 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Banking Superv  1748 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Privatization  1748 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Capital Account  1748 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Securities Market  1748 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Notes: There are three data sets: (1) ISIC3 revision 2, trade data, from UN COMTRADE (2) Data on the industry financial structure at ISIC3 revision 2 level 
from Braun (2003), and (3) Data on financial reform from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010).
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Table 3.2 Correlations among Exports and Reform Indicators 
 Exports 
Fin. 
Reforms 
Credit 
Controls 
Interest 
Rate 
Entry 
Barriers 
Banking 
Superv 
Privati 
-zation 
Capital 
Account 
Securities 
Market 
          
Exports 1.00         
Fin.Reforms 0.38 1.00        
Credit Controls 0.20 0.67 1.00       
Interest Rate 0.23 0.74 0.53 1.00      
Entry Barriers 0.17 0.69 0.37 0.45 1     
Banking Superv 0.27 0.64 0.40 0.38 0.36 1    
Privatization 0.19 0.62 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.31 1   
Capital Account 0.29 0.73 0.44 0.55 0.45 0.39 0.39 1  
Securities Market 0.46 0.67 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.28 0.55 1 
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Table 3.3a Average Value of Exports by Different Category of Reform Indicators 
 *Exports 
 Reform=0 Obs. Reform=1 Obs. 
Credit Controls 842.57 20226 2633.00 27546 
Interest Rate 758.04 13996 2337.78 33776 
Entry Barriers 1376.94 16829 2145.81 30943 
Banking Superv 1066.86 33042 3687.65 14730 
Privatization 1371.93 24979 2426.22 22793 
Capital Account 625.38 17869 2621.66 29903 
Securities Market 359.80 19595 2928.63 28177 
* Exports are in 1,000,000 constant USD.  
113 
 
Table 3.3b Average Value of Exports by Different Category of Reform Indicators in 
China 
 *Exports 
 Reform=0 Obs. Reform=1 Obs. 
Credit Controls 3164.10 342 12694.78 224 
Interest Rate 5265.77 510 22146.58 56 
Entry Barriers 6935.96 566 0 0 
Banking Superv 2869.39 314 12003.04 252 
Privatization 6935.96 566 0 0 
Capital Account 6935.96 566 0 0 
Securities Market 5265.77 510 22146.58 56 
* Exports are in 1,000,000 constant USD.  
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Table 3.4a Estimation Results with Full Dataset 
VARIABLES Credit 
Controls 
Interest Rate Entry 
Barriers 
Banking 
Superv 
Privatization Capital 
Account 
Securities 
Market 
                
GDP 0.0958*** 0.0867*** 0.105*** 0.173*** 0.0977*** 0.0985*** 0.0511* 
 (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0298) 
Fin.Reforms 0.847*** 0.960*** 0.665*** 0.878*** 0.802*** 0.724*** 0.332*** 
 (0.0906) (0.0913) (0.0866) (0.0794) (0.0864) (0.0895) (0.0832) 
Creditcontrols_dum -0.104**       
 (0.0452)       
Creditcontrols_Fin.Dep. 0.800***       
 (0.0465)       
Creditcontrols_Tang -0.479***       
 (0.109)       
Intratecontrols_dum  -0.349***      
  (0.0490)      
Intratecontrols_Fin.Dep.  0.796***      
  (0.0506)      
Intratecontrols_Tang  0.0768      
  (0.119)      
Entrybarriers_dum   -0.0540     
   (0.0467)     
Entrybarriers_Fin.Dep.   0.452***     
   (0.0482)     
Entrybarriers_Tang   0.103     
   (0.113)     
Bankingsuperv_dum    -0.290***    
    (0.0457)    
Bankingsuperv_Fin.Dep.    0.757***    
    (0.0496)    
Bankingsuperv_Tang    -0.605***    
    (0.117)    
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(continued) 
Privatization_dum     -0.0636   
     (0.0453)   
Privatization_Fin.Dep.     0.847***   
     (0.0459)   
Privatization_Tang     -0.575***   
     (0.108)   
Capitalacount_dum      0.145***  
      (0.0454)  
Capitalacount _Fin.Dep.      0.929***  
      (0.0474)  
Capitalacount _Tang      -1.151***  
      (0.111)  
SecuritesMKT _dum       0.650*** 
       (0.0453) 
SecuritesMKT _Fin.Dep.       1.066*** 
       (0.0464) 
SecuritesMKT _Tang       -1.519*** 
       (0.109) 
Constant 6.179*** 6.312*** 6.071*** 3.191*** 6.178*** 6.247*** 6.676*** 
 (0.289) (0.290) (0.290) (0.293) (0.293) (0.291) (0.289) 
        
Observations 47,772 47772 47772 47772 47772 47772 47772 
R-squared 0.777 0.777 0.776 0.777 0.777 0.778 0.780 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Exporter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
MSE 1.620 1.621 1.623 1.619 1.619 1.617 1.609 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4b Estimation Results without China 
VARIABLES Credit 
Controls 
Interest Rate Entry 
Barriers 
Banking 
Superv 
Privatization Capital 
Account 
Securities 
Market 
                
GDP 0.0648** 0.0592* 0.0772** 0.146*** 0.0716** 0.0689** 0.0213 
 (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0303) 
Fin.Reforms 0.924*** 1.002*** 0.685*** 0.920*** 0.833*** 0.738*** 0.366*** 
 (0.0913) (0.0917) (0.0871) (0.0799) (0.0869) (0.0900) (0.0835) 
Creditcontrols_dum -0.120***       
 (0.0457)       
Creditcontrols_Fin.Dep. 0.803***       
 (0.0469)       
Creditcontrols_Tang -0.513***       
 (0.110)       
Intratecontrols_dum  -0.315***      
  (0.0496)      
Intratecontrols_Fin.Dep.  0.829***      
  (0.0514)      
Intratecontrols_Tang  -0.0752      
  (0.121)      
Entrybarriers_dum   -0.00165     
   (0.0472)     
Entrybarriers_Fin.Dep.   0.476***     
   (0.0489)     
Entrybarriers_Tang   -0.0424     
   (0.115)     
Bankingsuperv_dum    -0.310***    
    (0.0461)    
Bankingsuperv_Fin.Dep.    0.752***    
    (0.0501)    
Bankingsuperv_Tang    -0.566***    
    (0.118)    
117 
 
(continued) 
Privatization_dum     -0.0312   
     (0.0456)   
Privatization_Fin.Dep.     0.866***   
     (0.0463)   
Privatization_Tang     -0.680***   
     (0.109)   
Capitalacount_dum      0.201***  
      (0.0459)  
Capitalacount _Fin.Dep.      0.962***  
      (0.0480)  
Capitalacount _Tang      -1.313***  
      (0.113)  
SecuritesMKT _dum       0.692*** 
       (0.0457) 
SecuritesMKT _Fin.Dep.       1.090*** 
       (0.0469) 
SecuritesMKT _Tang       -1.648*** 
       (0.110) 
Constant 7.478*** 9.962*** 10.10*** 5.802*** 9.948*** 9.915*** 10.37*** 
 (0.292) (0.309) (0.308) (0.311) (0.307) (0.310) (0.307) 
        
Observations 47,206 47206 47206 47206 47206 47206 47206 
R-squared 0.775 0.775 0.774 0.775 0.775 0.776 0.778 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Exporter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
MSE 1.623 1.624 1.627 1.623 1.622 1.620 1.612 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A3.1 List of Countries in Sample 
Albania Finland Nepal 
Algeria France Netherlands 
Argentina Georgia New Zealand 
Australia Germany Nicaragua 
Austria Ghana Nigeria 
Azerbaijan Greece Norway 
Bangladesh Guatemala Pakistan 
Belarus Hong Kong, China Paraguay 
Belgium Hungary Peru 
Bolivia India Philippines 
Brazil Indonesia Poland 
Bulgaria Ireland Portugal 
Burkina Faso Israel Russian Federation 
Cameroon Italy Senegal 
Canada Jamaica Singapore 
Chile Japan South Africa 
China Jordan Spain 
Colombia Kazakhstan Sri Lanka 
Costa Rica Kenya Sweden 
Cote d'Ivoire Korea, Rep. Switzerland 
Czech Republic Kyrgyz Republic Thailand 
Denmark Latvia Tunisia 
Dominican Republic Lithuania Turkey 
Ecuador Madagascar United Kingdom 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Malaysia United States 
El Salvador Mexico Uruguay 
Estonia Morocco Venezuela 
Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Mozambique Zimbabwe 
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of financial dependence and asset tangibility. In both the second and the third 
essays, two and three digit export flows were used to mitigate potential 
endogeneity problems. Also, robustness checks by excluding China from the 
sample are carried out. 
Findings and Conclusions:  Firstly, I find that the depreciation of housing assets and 
volatility does not show economically significant effects on either household‘s 
consumption pattern or asset allocation. The conclusion that the collapse of 
housing market accompanying a financial crisis is responsible for decline in 
consumption does not necessarily follow. Secondly, financial development is 
positively related to exports. Trust increases exports in less financially developed 
countries by supplementing formal credit with informal capital resources, and the 
effects are more significant without China. Thirdly, greater levels of financial 
liberalization increase exports if the measure provides new channels of credits, 
and decreases exports if it represses accessibility of external capital. Effect of 
liberalization is more important in industries with higher financial dependence or 
less tangible assets.     
 
